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PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE
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Reference :-
TLC.O. 885
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PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON
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The advisability of all the Governments of self-governing Colonies introducing legislation to confer on Governors in Council the necessary powers might be suggested to the Premiers.
The Orders in Council above referred to deals with Gibraltar, Malta, St. Lucia, Sierra Leone, St. Helena, Mauritius, Ceylon, Hong Kong, and the Straits Settlements.
In addition to these Colonies and to those having representative Government, there remain Bermuda, Jamaica, and Barbados, where it would be desirable to be able to confer similar powers on the Governors, but where there is no power of legislating by Order in Council, and where the non-official majorities of the legislative bodies would probably prevent the matter being dealt with by these bodies. If an opportunity offers it might be desirable to consult with gentlemen from these Colonies, and in any cvent action taken in the matter by the elected Assemblies of the self-governing Colonies would strengthen the hands of the Imperial Government in dealing with the West Indian Islands.
M. NATHAN, Secretary,
Colonial Defence Committee.
June 12th, 1897.
Enclosure 1.
INTERCHANGE OF UNITS BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND CANADA.
Memorandum by Major-General I. J. C. Herbert.
Ottawa, May 10, 1894. It is generally admitted in Canada that the presence of the Imperial troops in the Dominion assisted very materially in developing a military spirit in the population. Those troops, possessing thoroughly trained officers and non-commissioned officers, furnished training schools, in which all ranks of the Canadian Militia received a sound instruction in their drill and duties. The withdrawal of these troops left the Canadian Militia without any efficient system of training, without instructors, and without a model of military organisation and efficiency. The natural result was 20 years of steady deterioration of the Militia Force.
2. The Permanent Force of Canada was raised to remedy this state of things. It has succeeded to a limited extent only. The following are the principal causes of its failure:-
(1.) Officers to whom the command of this force has been entrusted, and in some cases also the duty of raising and organising new levies have had a very imperfect training and no practical experience in military command.
(2.) Commissions have been given without sufficient reference to natural fitness, or to the technical or educational qualification of the person appointed. Elements, undesirable from a moral as well as a military point of view, have thus been introduced, together with the spirit of insubordination inseparable from a system of patronage. The result has been to lower the force in the public estimation, and to prevent its acquiring the prestige which should attach to a regular military force.
(3.) Officers, and, to a certain extent, non-commissioned officers, have looked upon their appointments as sinecure situations. The higher sentiment of duty which is required in any army has therefore not been properly understood, nor has there been much voluntary professional study.
(4.) The nature of the organization was necessarily rudimentary in its early stages. It has continued in this rudimentary state, because those in command have not realised the necessity for development, nor the practical methods to be adopted towards that end.
3. Notwithstanding this experience, I am strongly of opinion that the policy of maintaining a strictly Canadian permanent or regular force, is a sound one, from a military as well as a political point of view, and recent changes have done much to remedy some of the evils complained of. It is, however, universally recognised that no force which is purely local in its character can be maintained at a high standard of efficiency, and that long continuance at the same station, absence of competition, and constant inspection by the same officer all tend to produce deterioration.
4. The question therefore arises: "How are the Canadian regulars to be raised to "the standard of efficiency of Her Majesty's regular troops, invested with a measure of prestige in the eyes of the Canadian public, and deprived of their thoroughly local " character?"!
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I would suggest, as the most effective method, that the Canadian "permanent " or regular units be made interchangeable with similar units of the Imperial regular army, or, in other words, the application to Canada, in an extended form, of a principle which is already followed in providing for the defence of Her Majesty's Indian possessions. By this means a Canadian permanent unit raised and organised in Canada would be transferred to the home establishment of the Imperial Army, made a charge upon Imperial funds, and quartered for a term of years at a large station such as Aldershot. In return a unit of similar strength would be transferred to a Canadian station, and become a charge on Canadian funds for a similar term of years. To take an example: "A" Field Battery R.C.A., leaving its horses and material at Kingston, would take over those of a field battery of Royal Artillery of a similar strength at Aldershot, which would be transferred to Kingston, taking over the horses and material which it would find there. When the organisation of the Royal Regiment of Canadian Infantry is further advanced, a similar interchange of a battalion could be effected.
5. Each Government would necessarily be required to bear the charge of transport for its own troops, eg., British troops en route to Canada would be paid for by the Imperial Government; Canadian troops en route to Great Britain by the Canadian Government, and would likewise assume naturally the burden of the non-effective charges of its own service. There are certain points of difference between the two services, such as the rates of pay and the scales of rations, and allowances, which would require discussion in detail, and there are points connected with command which would require definition; but these matters present no difficulties which are incapable of adjustment, provided their discussion is approached on the basis of the broad principle underlying this scheme, viz., the admission of regular troops, raised and paid in Canada, to a partnership in the Imperial Army.
6. I submit the following as some of the advantages which would follow from the adoption of this principle:-
(a.) Military.
1. An increased efficiency of Canadian troops from contact with masses of British troops in Great Britain.
2. The furnishing of correct models of military organisation to the militia forces in Canada by the presence of British troops amongst them.
3. The Canadian officers would be improved both individually and as a whole by contact with professional soldiers, and would become better qualified to organise and train the militia force of the country.
4. The Canadian public would cease to look down upon its own permanent force, but would, on the contrary, regard it with pride if it were considered good enough to be placed on an equal footing with her Majesty's regular forces.
(b.) Politically.
1. The interchange of British and Canadian troops would be a living sign of the solidarity of Her Majesty's Empire, and it would especially enhance, in the eyes of foreign States, the political importance of the self-governing Colonies of Great Britain. 2. It would promote a mutual and close personal acquaintance between the mother- country and Canada which could not fail to be of benefit to both.
3. Ever since the conquest of Canada the value of discharged soldiers as Colonists has been a marked feature in Canadian history, and is noticeable even in the present day. The scheme proposed would undoubtedly have the effect of retaining many of this useful class in Canada.
4. It may almost be stated as an axiom that British capital follows British troops. 5. The problem of the mutual support of the parts of the Empire for the military defence of common interests would be approached in a practical manner, and detached from the question of fiscal systems, which has hitherto been inseparable from the academical discussions upon it.
6. I have herein roughly sketched the ideas which I submitted to you recently in conversation. Should you on further consideration regard the scheme as practicable, this Memorandum, though necessarily imperfect, may furnish sufficient material on which to base a communication to Her Majesty's Imperial Government.
1. J. C. HERBERT, Major-General, Commanding Canadian Militia.
To the Honourable Minister Militia and Defence.
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