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PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE
C.O.
Reference :-
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Section B.-Measures to be taken during the period immediately following the cessation of hostilities.
3. As stated in B. II., the War has put an end to all the treaties of commerce between the Allies and the Enemy Powers, but the Berlin Act, 1885, which places Uganda in the conventional basin of the Congo, is presumably not affected, as enemy signatories form only a few of the assenting parties, and until this Act is renounced, together with the Brussels Act, 1890, the question of most-favoured- nation treatment cannot be considered, owing to the specific provision in their terms according uniform treatment to the trade of all nations, besides the ten per cent. limitation imposed.
I think there is little doubt but that the original purpose for which the Berlin and Brussels Acts were entered into, viz., the suppression of slave trade and control of the liquor and arms traffics in Central Africa, has long since been accomplished, and, as all the territories affected are now under close administra- tion and enjoy their own system of laws, there would appear to be no adequate Their retention under reason to preclude the definite renouncement of these Acts.
existing conditions nullifies or restricts the powers of the countries concerned to co-operate in a practical manner in adopting the recommendations of the Economic Conference, and, for the reasons submitted, I would urge strongly that Great Britain should withdraw from the Berlin and Brussels Acts, whose purposes may be regarded as fully attained.
4. Assuming that steps will be taken to remove the existing barrier to differential treatment, the following suggestions are put forward for consideration :- · (a) Differential Import Dues on the manufactures and products of all countries not in receipt of most-favoured-nation treatment. Imports into East Africa and Uganda at present pay ten per cent. ad valorem duty. For countries not in receipt of most-favoured-nation treatment I suggest the duty be raised to thirty-three-and-one-third per
cent.
This will avoid any complicated procedure, as only two sets of ad valorem dues will be in force, viz., ten per cent. and thirty-three-and-one- third per cent., and should also meet the danger of dumping referred to in B. IV. of the recommendations
(b) Differential Export Dues on produce exported to countries not in receipt of most-favoured-nation treatment.
I suggest all raw produce exported to these countries should be subject to a ten per cent. ad valorem tax at the port of shipment, in addition to any ordinary export tax imposed.
(c) Increased Shipping and Registration Dues on vessels the property of
countries not in receipt of most-favoured-nation treatment. This would depend on whether the East Africa ports could be adequately served by British and friendly shipping, as, if not, any increase of local dues at Mombasa would react inevitably on the British consignee.
(d) An alteration in the existing licensing laws restricting licences to trade for a period of five years to subjects of most-favoured-nations only, to be followed by a surtax on all licences to trade subsequently issued.
During the period immediately following the War it is strongly advisable that no enemy firms should be allowed to establish themselves or to take out licences to trade until conditions become normal.
The question of the amount of surtax could be considered later.
(e) The enactment of local legislation prohibiting the sale, lease, or transfer of property to other than most-favoured-nation subjects for a period of five years.
This is necessary to prevent the re-establishment of enemy firms referred to above.
(ƒ) An alteration in the existing cotton-buying laws limiting the issue of licences to most-favoured-nation subjects.
Prior to the
Cotton is the chief raw material produced in Uganda. War considerable quantities of seed cotton were bought and ginned by German firms for shipment to Germany. The existing legislation
pre- scribes that seed cotton can be purchased only under licence from the Government, and I would suggest that this should be extended to exclude
5.
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all other than most-favoured-nation subjects for a period of five years, when the position can be reconsidered, if necessary.
(g) The introduction of legislation to confine dealing in raw produce to most-favoured-nation subjects only.
In regard to other raw products the produce of this Protectorate, viz., coffee, rubber, hides, cacao, etc., I am in favour of restrictive legislation being enacted to confine dealing to most-favoured-nation subjects on similar lines to those indicated for the cotton industry.
Section C.-Permanent Measures.
I have thought it advisable to discuss the suggestions in paragraph 4 (/) and (g) under Section B in preference to Section C, as any steps to conserve raw material for the Allies should be taken at an early date. The subsequent policy will depend on the mutual co-operation referred to.
II.-COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL. POLICY COMMITTEE.
(a) What industries are essential to the future safety of the nation; and what steps should be taken to maintain or establish them?
6. It is understood that this question has a far wider application than can possibly concern Uganda, but I would emphasize the need for safeguarding raw material, more particularly cotton, the adequate supply of which is an Imperial necessity. In paragraph 4 I have indicated certain suggestions for controlling the disposal of produce during the period immediately following the cessation of hostilities, but, no matter what precautions are taken locally, the tendency will be for exporters to sell to the highest bidder, whether enemy or otherwise. As the disposal of produce after it leaves the Protectorate is an aspect of the wider question, however. I suggest the British Cotton Growing Association should be consulted with regard to directing Uganda cotton into its requisite channels. (b) What steps should be taken to recover home and foreign trade lost during the War, and to secure new markets?
7. This scarcely applies to Uganda unless it is intended to refer to the trade in blankets, hardware, lamps, coloured and fancy cloths, and agricultural imple- ments, which were manufactured of cheap materials in Germany and Austria prior to the War and supplied to the natives in this Protectorate. In a country such as this, where native wages are not generally high, the goods sold to natives must be of a quality which is within their means, and the market remains at the disposal of whatever merchant can supply best what is required. It is by indif- ference to this aspect of the question that much of the British trade in cotton goods, hardware, etc., has been alienated to the Central Powers, and no preferential tariffs or other restrictions short of entire prohibition will prevent its recur- rence, unless merchants and manufacturers are prepared to study and cater for the native market.
(c) To what extent, and by what means, the resources of the Empire should, and can, be developed.
8. The most crying need in this Protectorate is for transport facilities. Much has been done in this respect, but what is yet required is the driving of a railway through the heart of the country which will link the Uganda Railway to the confines of the Congo. Vast stretches of fertile land still remain under native cultivation which could be utilized for the raising of products for export to England and elsewhere if railway facilities were provided. I am aware that funds for this purpose are not at present available, but the issues are so important that I take this opportunity of again bringing to your notice the potential value of this Protectorate if a rapid and reasonably cheap means of transport could be provided. Every effort will be made to increase the output of raw produce with the means of transport at our disposal, but there are thousands upon thousands of natives employed in head porterage whose labours could be centred much more profitably on production.
(d) To what extent, and by what means, the sources of supply within the Empire can be prevented from falling under foreign control.
9. I have indicated in paragraph 4 what would appear to be the best pro- cedure for five years from the cessation of hostilities. Experience will show whether these measures are sufficiently effective, and they can be modified or extended as considered desirable.