PUBLIC RECORD
OFFICE
Reference :-
PEPELE C.O-885
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17 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON
ALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHIC-
COPYRIGHT PHOTOGRAPH-NOT TO
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The late Governor of the Straits Settlements also proposed this, but several other suggestions have come from this Colony, viz. :—
(a) Subsidised competition outside the "Ring." (b) Subsidy to British companies to enable them to compete with subsidised Continental com- panies.
(c) Quashing the Conference as an illegal society
under Colonial law.
Only one Colony appears to have actually done something to put a stop to any injuries that may be inflicted by these agreements. The enclosures to the Victoria report include a letter from the Acting Premier of New Zealand stating that they have chartered steamers for the conveyance of Colonial produce to England and South Africa at a minimum rate of freight. "This was the only way in which we could see that practical work could be done "by the Colony."
The Governor of Hong Kong suggests that shippers should form a combination and charter their own steamers.
DIFFICULTY OF OBTAINING EVIDENCE.
It is remarkable that in several cases a Colony states that no evidence exists for such agreements, whereas a neighbouring Colony will give full details of agreements covering both. For instance, Queens- land (and apparently Victoria) are not aware of any such agreements. New South Wales (and New Zealand) gives minute details of agreements cover- ing all Australia. Sierra Leone knows of no West African agreement. Lagos and the Niger Coast know all about it.
It may be concluded that the existence of such agreements is not made public.
Much of the most interesting evidence can only be obtained under a pledge of secrecy, and reference is sometimes made to the reluctance of persons well acquainted with shipping matters to speak.
The Confidential Hong Kong Report refers to the witnesses by number, no names being printed, and their evidence was given on the understanding that it should not be published in the Colony. The Committee reports (paragraph 10):-
44
--
The Committee, moreover, feel bound to record their conviction that several of the witnesses were indisposed to speak freely on this subject of the Shipping Conference.”
The Collector of Customs at Sydney prefaces his report by remarking: "Although I made it "understood that no publicity would be given to "information received, and that the replies would "be treated as of confidential character, there has "been an, undoubted reluctance on the part of "those interested to afford any full or detailed "information."
The Secretary for Trade and Customs in Victoria says:
"There was apparently a disinclination to speak freely on the subject."
In New Zealand very little could be got out of the Agents, and we are not informed in what inanner
23
the interesting documents sent were obtained (see part II. of Memo., Appendix D.).
The majority of the details furnished in the South Australian Report are from the letter of an agent who writes " on the understanding that
you "will deal with our letter as confidential, as, for "obvious reasons, we would be averse to our name
"being used."
VALUE OF EVIDENCE.
A few words may be said on the relative value of the evidence produced before any general conclusion can be drawn.
Merchants and traders generally may be expected to be biassed against any agreement that would in their opinion raise freights. They would be upt to believe ill of the effects of such agreements. Their evidence against them may be regarded as occa- sionally biassed.
This observation would not apply to evidence for their existence.
Agents of shipping firms would not be likely to be biassed against agreements. As it has been shown that for some reason they do not like it to be known that they are giving information, details obtained confidentially may be considered of high value.
Negative evidence is of much value as showing that no ill-effects occur, for if an agreement (which injured trade) existed in a Colony, it is most unlikely that it would not be a subject of discussion among traders and thereby become known to the Government when making enquiries; but negative evidence would seem to be of little value in con- sidering the question as to whether agreements exist at all.
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS.
The agreements which have been described above are not of the nature of "Trusts
" which place the management of a large number of businesses under one head and reduce production without affecting the cost of production much. Nor are they amalgamations" like the recently formed steel "Trust in the United States, which aim at effecting economies by the combination of many businesses into one.
"
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They are Rings," that is associations of com- peting businesses which agree to eliminate one particular element of competition--in this case, rate of freight.
The various members continue to compete in speed, safety, care, and other matters of importance to shippers. A considerable body of current economic opinion holds that such a transference of centre of competition tends ultimately to efficiency, and therefore to improve the net advantages offered to shippers.
I do not know whether it is supposed that such improvement would counterbalance the attractions of the low freights offered by competing lines to America. If not, it would seem to follow that America must have an advantage, which, however,
PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE
Reference :-
C.O.
+885
17 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON
ALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHIC-
COPYRIGHT PHOTOGRAPH-NOT TO
23
the interesting documents sent were obtained (see part II. of Memo., Appendix D.).
The majority of the details furnished in the South Australian Report are from the letter of an agent who writes “ on the understanding that
you
will deal with our letter as confidential, as, for obvious reasons, we would be averse to our name being used."
VALUE OF EVIDENCE.
A few words may be said on the relative value of the evidence produced before any general conclusion can be drawn.
Merchants and traders generally may be expected o be biassed against any agreement that would in heir opinion raise freights. They would be apt to believe ill of the effects of such agreements. Their vidence against them may be regarded as occa- ionally biassed.
This observation would not apply to evidence or their existence.
Agents of shipping firms would not be likely o be biassed against agreements. As it has been
hown that for some reason they do not like it to e known that they are giving information, details btained confidentially may be considered of high alue.
Negative evidence is of much value as showing hat no ill-effects occur, for if an agreement (which njured trade) existed in a Colony, it is most nlikely that it would not be a subject of discussion mong traders and thereby become known to the ¡overnment when making enquiries; but negative
vidence would seem to be of little value in con- idering the question as to whether agreements xist at all.
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS.
*
The agreements which have been described bove are not of the nature of "Trusts which lace the management of a large number of usinesses under one head and reduce production ithout affecting the cost of production much. or are they " amalgamations "like the recently rmed steel "Trust in the United States, which m at effecting economies by the combination of any businesses into one.
They are "Rings," that is associations of com- ting businesses which agree to eliminate one rticular element of competition-in this case, te of freight.
The various members continue to compete in eed, safety, care, and other matters of importance shippers. A considerable body of current onomic opinion holds that such a transference of ntre of competition tends ultimately to efficiency, d therefore to improve the net advantages offered shippers.
I do not know whether it is supposed that such provement would counterbalance the attractions the low freights offered by competing lines to nerica. If not, it would seem to follow that nerica must have an advantage, which, however,