15,174.
PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE
السلسا
CO.
Reference :-
885
12 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON
ALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHIC- COPYRIGHT PHOTOGRAPH—NOT TO
i
MY LORD,
No. 279.
(GIBRALTAR.)
LAW OFFICERS to COLONIAL OFFICE.
We were honoured with your Lordship's commands signified in Mr. Wingfield's letter of the 31st ultimo, stating that he was directed by your Lordship to transmit to
Temple, August 1882. us copies (which were enclosed) of two confidential Despatches from the Governor of Gibraltar, with the enclosures to one of them specified reference to two recent cases of homicide by soldiers serving in the garrison of the margin, in which, with Gibraltar, against whom verdicts of manslaughter had been returned, questions were raised as to the criminal jurisdiction of the Civil Courts of Gibraltar over members of the garrison, and the power of the Governor to prevent the exercise of such jurisdiction if it existed.
That Mr. Wingfield was also to enclose for reference a copy of the Gibraltar Charter of Justice of the 1st September 1830, and a printed copy of a case submitted to the Law Officers of the Crown and the Judge Advocate-General, by the direction of the Secretary of State for War, with reference to the action to be taken by the Governor in one of the cases above mentioned, and of their opinion thereon.
That up to the year 1830, when the existing Supreme Court of Gibraltar was con- stituted by Letters Patent (commonly known as the Charter of Justice) no civil court in Gibraltar had criminal jurisdiction over officers and soldiers in actual pay as members of the garrison, such jurisdiction being expressly excluded in the successive Charters constituting civil courts of judicature in 1752 and 1817.
That the Articles of War, both before and after the date of the Charter of Justice of 1830 up to 1878 (see article 102 of 1830 and article 143 of 1878), provided for the trial by general court martial of officers and soldiers serving in Gibraltar accused of civil offences; and this jurisdiction appeared to have been continued by the Army Discipline and Regulation Act, 1879 (s. 41.) and the Army Discipline Act, 1881 (s. 41.).
That the Charter of Justice of 1830 conferred jurisdiction on the Supreme Court of Gibraltar in all criminal cases arising within the garrison and territory of Gibraltar, and over all persons residing and being within the said garrison and territory, save as therein-after was excepted, and did not contain any express exception from such juris- diction of officers and soldiers serving in the garrison; but it appeared to have been considered from the date of the Charter until the recent cases above referred to occurred, that the Supreme Court had no criminal jurisdiction over members of the garrison, and, so far as could be ascertained, no member of the garrison had ever been tried by the Supreme Court.
That Sir George Murray, the Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, in his Despatch of 4th September 1830, transmitting the Charter of Justice to the Governor of Gibraltar, observed that the Charter had carefully reserved the powers of courts martial: and he directed that upon the trial of members of the garrison before courts martial for civil offences, the Attorney-General should be instructed to attend and execute the duties of Judge Advocate.
That Governor Sir Robert Wilson, in his Despatch of the 16th of December 1842, stated that all proceedings for criminal offences against an officer or soldier in the garrison of Gibraltar must take place under the 102nd Article of War, which was the military charter of the forces employed there, and which withdrew every military man from the jurisdiction of the civil criminal courts.
That the same construction of the 102nd Article of War was adopted by Mr. Martin Stokes, in the opinion which was enclosed in Lord Napier's Despatch.
That the Attorney-General of Gibraltar, however, was of opinion that under the Charter of Justice and the Army Discipline Act, 1881, the Supreme Court had a con- current jurisdiction with a court martial to try a member of the garrison for any offence for which he would be triable if he were not subject' to military law; that he also held (differing therein from the opinion of the Law Officers of the Crown) that the proviso
▲ 19194.–259. 25.—19/64.
2