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4. It is now generally accepted that the Committee System has many distinct advantages. Our duty was therefore to make such suggestions for its modification as would tend to preserve its good features while removing those which hamper the smooth and efficient working of the Constitution. In order to achieve this end, we proposed in our memorandum to limit the scope and activities of the Executive Committees in three directions, viz.: (1) the initiation of financial policy, (2) the election of Ministers, and (3) the question of appointments to the Public Service.
5. As regards the first proposal, Your Excellency holds the view that, if given effect to, it would ultimately reduce the Committees to the position of purely advisory bodies. We beg to differ. Our proposal is to transfer the power of initiation of financial policy to the Board of Ministers, but, in the carrying out of that policy, if accepted by the Council. the Executive Committees will have ample opportunities of rendering much useful service. Further, the shifting of this power of initiating financial policy to the Board of Ministers does not at all mean that the Committees will have no voice in financial matters so far as they relate to departments under their respective control. They will of course become advisory in that respect, but the above enumeration of their present duties clearly shows that they will yet retain considerable power in their hands and deal with a wide range of subjects. It should be further noted that in recommending the Committee System the Donoughmore Commissioners had in view the object of giving an opportunity to Councillors who were not members of the Ministry to familiarize themselves at first hand with the work undertaken by departments. Our proposal will leave unimpaired to Members of the Council these opportunities for training themselves in the details of administration and at the same time add strength and responsibility to the Board of Ministers which is lacking in the present system.
6. As regards our second proposal relating to the election of Ministers, there is undoubtedly a considerable body of public opinion against the present method, viz., the election of Ministers by the Committees. The majority of Ministers are of opinion that the method proposed by them will not only ensure the selection of Ministers in whom the Council as a whole will have confidence, but also place the Ministers them- selves in a position of greater responsibility to the Council and be more conducive to securing united action on the part of the Board of Ministers. As to the necessity for a change in the existing method of electing Ministers, we need do no more than refer to Your Excellency's own view contained in paragraphs (1) and (2) of your letter to the Chairman of the Board of Ministers dated 17th February, 1933, wherein you say :-
"While I am of opinion that the time has not yet arrived to recommend to the Secretary of State for the Colonies any fundamental changes in the Constitution, certain suggestions for amendment have been made which I feel should be further examined without delay.
(a) That the method of election of Ministers should be altered. With regard to the first proposal, namely, to alter the method of election of Ministers, there appears to be a general consensus of opinion that the present method of election by Committees is not satisfactory though there is no measure of agreement upon any alternative method. Objection to the present method is based mainly on the ground that it does not give to those chosen any assurance of support either in their Committees or in the Council. Provided a more satisfactory method can be devised which does not conflict with the Committee System and is acceptable both to the Board of Ministers and to the State Council, I should be prepared to recommend its adoption to the Secretary of State on the understanding that it will not take effect during the life of the present State Council."
7.
With respect to our proposal for the discontinuance of the present practice of referring to Executive Committees recommendations for appointment to the Public Service, Your Excellency has yourself stated, in your letter of 17th February referred to above, the main objections that can be urged against this procedure.
8. Your Excellency drew our attention to the apparent conflict between the first and the sixth resolutions of Mr. E. W. Perera and our proposals with regard to the special powers of the Governor. In these resolutions Mr. Perera asked for the repeal of the Governor's powers-
(a) in matters of paramount importance and matters essential to give effect to
the provisions of the Order in Council (Article 22);
(b) to authorize expenditure allowed under the Order in Council or laws other
than the annual appropriation law (Article 61);
(c) for the preservation of conditions of service of public officers (Article 87 (1),
(2), and (4).
(We agree that 87 (2) has been inadvertently omitted.)
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As already indicated above, our proposals were not meant to run counter to the resolutions passed by the State Council. In our memorandum, we asked for the curtailment of the special powers vested in the Governor, their restriction within well- defined limits, and that they be reserved for use only in an emergency. The cases we contemplate are only those where the safety or the tranquillity of the Island is concerned whether it involves legislation or expenditure. Article 22 should, we think, be amended accordingly. Every Constitution provides for emergencies of this type, but these extraordinary powers are not meant to be ordinarily invoked. In the words of the Donoughmore Commissioners as a country ascended the scale of self-government it is inevitable that the powers of the Governor must be consistent with the type of Constitution granted to the people.
9. We have placed in the very forefront of our proposals the demand for the removal of the three Officers of State and the creation of a homogeneous ministry wholly responsible to the Legislature. If such a ministry were formed it is to be expected that the Governor would use the special powers vested in him in accordance with the advice of his Ministers. If in any case such powers are wrongly used, the Ministers will be called upon to account for tife advice given by them. Should the Governor, however, use these powers without, consulting the Ministers or contrary to their advice, then the usual Constitutional consequences will necessarily follow involving the resignation of the Ministry.
10. With respect to the other powers of the Governor, viz.,,the powers of veto and assent, we were of opinion that they were necessary, especially in a unicameral Legislature, but only to the extent indicated in the fifth and sixth resolutions and we therefore did not think it necessary to comment on them.
11. We regret that our demand for the establishment of a Public Services Com- mission to deal with the matter of appointments, promotions, disciplinary control, &c., of public officers, composed of three persons unconnected with the Public Service or the State Council, does not find favour with Your Excellency. The objections to it appear to be twofold, viz. :-
(1) There are not three men in this Island outside the Council or the services
capable of being entrusted with such a responsible task.
(2) The Commission as at present constituted has worked satisfactorily.
In connexion with the first objection it has been suggested that there cannot be found in Ceylon eligible persons who have neither a political past nor hopes of an early political future. We submit that it is impossible to accept the position that a political career which has been either closed, or is hoped for in the future, must necessarily render a man otherwise qualified incompetent to be a member of such a body as a Public Services Commission. Nor can we agree that integrity and a sense of justice and fair play are the monopoly of the public service. On the contrary, we maintain that outside the State Council and the public services men can be found quite competent to discharge this onerous duty impartially and to the satisfaction of all parties concerned.
As regards the second objection, even if it is assumed that the existing system has worked satisfactorily, that is no reason why a better system should not now be introduced in accordance with the practice prevailing in such countries as Canada, Australia, and South Africa.
12. In our memorandum on the working of the Constitution (paragraph 10) we referred to what we considered to be a failure on Your Excellency's part to carry out the Royal Instructions in regard to free and frequent consultations with the Ministers in order to keep yourself "informed of their wishes and opinions and those of the people of the Island," while ample opportunities for discussing inatters of public interest were accorded to the Officers of State. We were gratified and reassured to hear from Your Excellency that our impression regarding consultations with Officers of State was not correct and that whenever they were consulted it was only in connexion with matters relating to the department under their control. We would, however, reiterate our opinion that freer and more frequent consultations with the Ministers on Your Excellency's own initiative would have removed many misunder- standings and contributed to the smoother working of the Constitution.
With regard to the reference of the Interim Report of the Salaries and Cadres Commission to the Secretary of State, Your Excellency insisted that you were entitled to seek, at any time and in any manner you might think fit, the advice and guidance of the Secretary of State in the exercise of your responsibilities. While we do not at
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