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1111 C.O.882/12
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PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON,
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(3) The Secretary of State has the final decision in all matters affecting the salary, emoluments, pensions, and gratuities, prospects and conditions of service of all public officers who held office at the date of the Constitution or are recruited there- after for posts the filling of which is subject to his approval.
Such in brief is an outline of the present Constitution. which depends for its successful working on the united and willing co-operation of all the component parts
to it.
The Constitution in Working.
9. The State Council. The power of the State Council to deal with administra- tive as well as legislative functions and the recognition of the right and responsibility attaching to each one of the unofficial Members has naturally resulted in a tendency on the part of the Council to devote a good deal of time to the examination of details which are better left in the hands of responsible Ministers and their Executive Com- mittees. But with growing experience this tendency may perhaps gradually dis- appear. Indeed it is difficult to imagine how such a large body as the State Council could attempt to conduct administration except by delegation of its powers to Standing Committees. This fact has been recognized to some extent by the Council itself, but it could hardly be expected that all the old preconceptions, prejudices, and suspicions should vanish forthwith. The Council on the whole, however, has acted with circum- spection and restraint, for it has happened that practically in every case the action taken by the responsible Executive Committee and reported to the Council for approval under Article 45 of the Order in Council has met with the approval of the Council. Out of 85 decisions of the Executive Committees reported to the Council ever since its inception up to the end of December, 1932, for approval, there is only one recorded instance of an Executive Committee's recommendation, and that on a subject of minor importance, having been turned down by the Council; two were referred back for further consideration; while the remainder with the exception of such few as were withdrawn. were approved by the Council.
10. Ministers and Executive Committees.-The Committee System has been in operation for a period of just over a year and a-half, and it is therefore too early to pass a verdict on its success or failure. There is undoubtedly a divergence of opinion ▾ on this point, but the State Council in the course of the debates on the Reform Motions after an experience of less than a year had expressed itself in favour of its continuance. The experience of individual Ministers varies, and as the success or failure depends to a large extent on the personnel of the Committee it is impossible for the Ministers collectively to give a considered opinion on the suitability or otherwise of the Com- mittee System in its present form. It has been suggested in many quarters that the executive functions of the Committee as a whole should devolve on the Minister acting on his own responsibility but with the advice of his Committee. The evolution of the Committee System in this direction will not only tend to promote the expeditious handling of business, but will facilitate the arduous task of the Board of Ministers in initiating and framing the financial policy of the Island by taking a comprehensive view of the needs of the country. In the absence of Ministerial responsibility each Executive Committee pursues its own policy, and there is no central authority under the Constitution which has the power to guide and co-ordinate the policies of the various Committees. It is obviously impossible for a large body like the State Council to take the place of a Cabinet. The proper body should be the Board of Ministers, but as it is, with responsibility for the execution of policies diffused among the members of the various Executive Committees, the Board of Ministers which is in- vested with ultimate financial responsibility has no means of enforcing its financial policy on any Executive Committee which chooses to ignore it.
11. Officers of State.-The attitude of the State Council, however, has naturally and rightly been different in respect of the subjects administered by the Officers of State. Neither the State Council nor the country can remain reconciled to a condition of affairs by which large and important functions of Government are administered by officials who are not responsible to the Legislature. The aim and object of those who recommended the present Constitution was the transfer to the elected representatives of the people of complete control over the internal affairs of the Island, subject only to provisions which will ensure during a transitory stage that they are helped by the advice of experienced officials and to the exercise by the Governor of certain safe- guarding powers. The Donoughmore Commissioners repeatedly laid stress on the fact that the Officers of State while being responsible in a ministerial capacity for
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administering those special departments retained in their charge should administer the departments with the primary object of assisting and not hampering their elected colleagues of whose policy their activities will be largely implementary. The recom- mendations as translated into the Order in Council, however, have created an altogether different situation. A form of Government has been created with marked and definite division of responsibility in administration, and the Constitution in its working has tended to emphasize the distinction between Officers of State and elected Ministers. The Officers of State regard themselves as officials who owe their allegiance to the Governor and accordingly have to account for their administration not to the Council but to the Governor alone, to whom they claim to be directly and solely responsible. They have the right to express both to the Governor and to the Council opinions which may not be in accordance with those held by their elected colleagues on the Board of Ministers. This right they have exercised, not infrequently thereby impairing unity of action on the part of the Board of Ministers even in matters in which collective responsibility is imposed on the Ministers and weakening the authority that should attach to the decisions of the Board (vide the observations of the Financial Secretary attached to the Ministers' proposals in connexion with the Scholarship in Forestry on page 228 of Hansard, 1932, the De Soysa Lying-in Home on page 1017 of Hansard, 1932, the Appropriation Bill of 1932-33 on page 2348 of Hansard, 1932, the Minneriya Development Scheme of Hansard, December, 1932, the Appropriation Bill of 1931-32). The maintenance of this anomalous position is one of the gravest defects of the Con- stitution and operates adversely against the successful and smooth working of this Constitution.
12. The Governor.--It was the intention of the Donoughmore Commissioners that all Ministers including Officers of State should be equally responsible for giving advice and assistance to the Governor. It is therefore incumbent on the Governor to preserve constant touch with the Ministers individually. And the Royal Instructions to the Governor are:--
(a) In all matters in which powers and functions are by that Order assigned either to the State Council, or to the Board of Ministers, or to Executive Committees, the Governor, in the exercise of that authority which is reserved to him in relation to those matters, shall give the most favourable consideration to the views expressed and to the advice tendered to him by the body in which those powers and functions reside. In all such matters he shall exercise his authority according to his own deliberate judgment, but in such manner that it shall be supervisory rather than executive, and he will not act contrary to the views or to the advice afore- said, unless he shall consider that the principles of Our said Order, or his own responsibility thereunder, shall so require.
(b) The Governor shall consult freely with his Ministers and shall seek to keep himself fully informed of their wishes and opinions and those of the people of the Island. He shall communicate to the Board of Ministers all public despatches which he shall address to or receive from any of Our Principal Secretaries of State relating to any subject or functions with which the Board of Ministers, or any Executive Committee, is concerned, and such other despatches as he shall think it expedient to communicate for the purpose of informing his Ministers of the tenor of current correspondence between him and any of Our Principal Secretaries of State
We regret to say, however, that our expectations in this regard have not been realized. It is no doubt true that the Governor has always shown his willingness to meet the Ministers if the latter chose to do so, but there has not been anything like a frequent consultation with the Ministers on his own initiative before arriving at important decisions. In fact, an inner Cabinet has been created composed of the three Officers of State who have been thus afforded special opportunities of obtaining the ear of the Governor and securing the adoption of measures without the knowledge or approval of the Board of Ministers. This is a development which is totally repugnant to the spirit and the letter of the Constitution and has enhanced the difficulties of working the Constitution.
Pension Minutes have been altered, amended, and added to on the advice of the Officers of State without any reference to the Board of Ministers or the State Council. It is true that the subject of pensions is one administered by the Financial Secretary. But it is none the less equally true that the alteration of any pension rule to the advantage of a public officer imposes a charge on the public revenue and no such measure, however small its financial implications may be, should be adopted without