PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE
Reference :-
CO. 885
PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON
ALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHIC- COPYRIGHT PHOTOGRAPH-NOT TO
Broad Core, See Map 1.
Dangers to which
St. John's is exposed, defe of existing
defences.
See Map 2.
.
Suggests battery on
North Head. Bee Map 2.
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contribution which must have been given up, in steamers, specie, and stores of all kinds. These steamers, thirty in number (Appendix A), turned loose on the trade of the St. Lawrence and the Canadian maritime provinces, would have produced immense havoc before our ships of war could have disposed of them. At the present moment St. John's is open to such a raid by a single vessel having on board 600 or 800 men available for landing, who, after capturing the steamers belonging to the sealing fleet, would be avail. able to man them.
31. Broad Cove, Conception Bay.
Another point in Conception Bay which might be used as a landing-place in fine weather is Broad Cove, about 2 miles to the southward of Portugal Cove. Although this place is not so favourable as the latter, there is a fairly good road practicable for troops leading from it and joining the main one from Portugal Cove on the west side of Windsor Lake. The ascent from the beach is very steep, and the country on each side of the road rugged as usual for the first mile or two, after which it passes through fir woods until it joins the main road.
32. General Remarks.
Having thus reviewed in detail the various batteries and defences of St. John's, together with the approaches thereto, it will now be necessary to consider the dangers to which it is exposed in the present day, and the value of the existing defences.
As previously stated at paragraph 24, the chief danger to be guarded against is not a regular expedition, but a sudden raid of one or two hostile cruizers, who, taking advantage of the defenceless state of the town, will probably endeavour to levy contributions and seize or destroy the stores and shipping. The attack may be made directly from the sea, or, what is more likely, by landing a force at one of the numerous points already mentioned. As regards the first case, an attack from the sea, the whole of the batteries were constructed many years before the introduction of rifled artillery, and, judging from their position, the chief object appears to have been to command the Narrows with a view of preventing an enemy from forcing the passage and approaching sufficiently near to attack the town. As will be seen from the Report on these batteries, paragraphs 6 to 13, they are all more or less in a dilapidated state, and would require a very considerable outlay for repairs and altera- tions, in order to render them suitable for modern artillery. Moreover, their position appears to be in many ways unsatisfactory, and it is a question whether they are suited to the requirements of the present day.
The increased range and accuracy of modern artillery has now rendered it possible to shell the town from a distance without exposure to fire from any guns which could be mounted on
existing batteries, excepting, perhaps, Fort Amherst, the position of which is not altogether satisfactory. This battery possesses the advantage of commanding the offing between the northward and eastward, but, on the other hand, it sees very little of that dangerous point, Freshwater Bay, and this must be considered a serious defect. Taking this fact into consideration, together with the expense necessary to put this battery into an effective condition, and also the disadvantages of its position as regards the proximity of the South Head lighthouse, which has been already referred to at paragraph 8, it is a question whether a better offing battery might not be constructed on the hill at North Head, on the opposite side of the entrance. This is immediately below Signal Hill, at an elevation of about 275 feet above the sea, and a battery in this position would possess many advantages over the one at Fort Amherst, for it would not only command the offing between Cuckold's Head and Freshwater Bay, but also the entrance to the harbour.
As regards the other harbour batteries, supposing they were armed and the harbour not protected by torpedoes, their position is such that a swift steamer, well handled, with a good local pilot on board, by making the coast to the northward at night, might run close in under the land to the entrance to the harbour, and then, by keeping close to the north side of the Narrows, might steam rapidly up into the harbour without sustaining much damage from the fire of the batteries.
Supposing such a thing to be attempted, it may be as well to consider during what time the vessel would be under the fire of the different batteries if she were moving at the rate of 8 knots. Fort Amherst would be the first battery to be encountered, and it may be calculated that by keeping well in under the land a vessel on a dark night would not be seen for more than three or four minutes before she made the entrance. She would then come under the fire of the batteries in the Narrows. The Queen's and Chain
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Rock could open fire as soon as she rounded the North Head, and she might be under their fire from four to five minutes, but as previously stated at paragraph 7, the fire from the Queen's Battery is too plunging to give a close defence, and its effect would be trifling, Waldegrave Battery would have the vessel under fire from three to four minutes, and after passing this she could run up the harbour without being exposed to fire from any other guns.
By effecting a landing at one of the numerous bays on the coast, from nearly all of Batteries at St. John's which fairly good roads converge on the capital, all the batteries constructed for the may be taken in defence of the harbour can be taken in reverse or commanded within easy range.
The peculiar configuration of the coast in the vicinity of St. John's renders this a very easy matter, as there are so many inlets from which an enemy after landing can advance and attack the rear or turn the flanks of any position which might be taken up to cover the town.
Although the principal danger would seem to be in an attack by land, there is nothing in the way of defences in this direction. Forts William and Townshend were probably intended to be of some use as a land defence, but as such they were found to be utterly useless, and have long been condemned. The town is perfectly open to attack, and more particularly from the southward and westward.
reverse.
See Map 1.
The country in the vicinity appears generally to be remarkably well adapted for Country in the defence, as it is mountainous, wild, and rugged, and broken by ridges running in a general ricinity of St. John's. direction of north-cast and south-west, with small valleys between them intersected by lakes and swamps. As a rule there is very little vegetation, and the rock is either bare or covered with stunted fir trees and undergrowth so thick that it is almost impossible to make way through it.
All these would become very formidable obstacles which might be made of the utmost use to the defence? and many very good positions suitable for a small force could be found commanding the roads by which an enemy would be compelled to advance.
north of St. John's.
If there were a sufficiently large force available a good position for defence against an Position on ridge attack from the north and west, and commanding the approaches from these directions, See Map 2. could be taken up by utilizing several strong buildings occupying the crest of the hill to the northward of the town. These are:-
Left: 1. The new Roman Catholic establishment of the "Christian Brothers," Left. standing on the crest of the hill about 150 yards north-west of Fort Townshend, and having a complete command over the surrounding country,
2. The Roman Catholic Cathedral, and strongly-built houses adjoining it, having an equally good command.
Centre: 3. The Provincial Buildings.
4. Government House.
Both these buildings command the country to the north and north-west and the roads from Portugal Cove and Torbay.
Centre.
Right: 5. The Penitentiary overlooking Quiddy Viddy Lake, and commanding the Right. roads from Quiddy Viddy, Logey Bay, Outer and Middle Coves, and Torbay.
All these buildings, which have been previously referred to at paragraph 31, are most favourably situated on the ridge; they are most substantially built of stone, and are three-storied.
The ground in front slopes gently to the stream flowing into Quiddy Viddy Lake. Ground in front. The left of this position might be thrown back on River Head above the head of the Left flank. harbour.
The right flank would rest on Signal Hill, where the ground is naturally very strong Right flank. and remarkably well suited for defence. This point, therefore, remains to be considered, for the enemy having either forced or turned the position, a final resistance could be made here, and the garrison might hold out for a considerable time.
HIL
Signal Hill is a peninsula which may be said to be almost isolated by the harbour on Description of Signal one side and Quiddy Viddy Lake on the other. The crest, which is 520 feet above the see Map 2. sea, is about 440 yards long, with an average width of about 70 yards. At the north- eastern extremity there is a small hill about 18 feet higher than the general crest-line, which it commands to the south-west. From time to time it is evident attempts have been made to increase the natural strength of this position by scarping away the rock, and it is believed that this point has always been looked upon as the citadel of St. John's, and as such the difficulties in the way of its being carried by an enemy are very great.
About 150 feet below the crest, in the neighbourhood of St. George's Pond, the Cover for troops. ground becomes tolerably level, and there are several good places where troops could be See Map 2. camped. From this plateau there are several spurs projecting to the northward and
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