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shall be, wholly or partly, into colonial connection; or whether these States may be dis- posed, of their own free will and accord, to remain under our protection, it is clear, that we ought, in the meantime, to endeavour to propitiate all classes of the people towards us, by every act of kindnes and generosity which may strengthen our moral and political re- lations with them, whilst we are securing our possession of those important fortresses which command harbours and roadsteads,* that will prove of inestimable value to Great Britain, in those vital occurrences, which sooner or later, must take place in these seas, and in the adjoining territories.
Without meaning to insinuate any faithless attempts, or hostile designs of aggrandise- ment, on the part of any of the Powers who have possessions in these quarters, but merely taking the facts as they are, and considering the changes that have taken place in political affairs in all the countries bordering upon these seas, since the Ionian Islands came under British protection; and giving those Powers which are extending their possessions and relations, full credit for honesty of purpose in pursuing their ends for their own legitimate advantage, I need only advert to Algiers, with its dependencies, and to Ancona, to Austria, which, though only an infant naval Power, is most active in extending her relations, and whose flag is seen more frequently than any other in the Adriatic, and passing these Islands displays itself no less actively in the Archipelago, the Levant, and Black Sea; to the un- settled state of Greece, and the intrigues of France and Russia to subvert our infu- ence in that country, and to gain supremacy in the royal closet. To the precarious existence of the Ottoman Empire in Europe: to the ambition of, and the encroachments making by Russia; to the combinations which, consequent upon any change at Constantinople, must take place in Egypt and in Syria, and in the continent opposite to this island: to the unsettled state of Spain, and the temptation which the possession of the Balearic Isles holds out to those who are evidently desirous of acquiring a naval station in the Mediter- ranean, I need only advert to these facts and circumstances to point out the increasing importance of these islands to Great Britain, not only as naval and military stations, but as points from which she may exercise great moral and political influence throughout this region, to counteract any design or attempt at aggrandisement, which may arise out of the present uncertain posture of affairs.
In a political sense these islands are in the anomalous condition of being in a sort of middle state between a colony and a perfectly independent country, without, in some respects, possessing the advantages of either. For, though the Ist Article of the Treaty of Paris stipulates that the Ionians Islands shall form a single, free, and independent State, yet the specific restrictions and limitations contained in the IInd IIIrd IVth and Vth Articles, are destructive to the most essential parts of Sovereign Power, and accordingly place them in an anomalous political condition, hitherto unknown in the history of nations.
They cannot for instance, except through the medium of the protecting country, enter into any Commercial Treaty with a Foreign Power, however advantageous it might be to their trade; whilst their commerce and navigation, are, by the laws of England, placed upon the same footing as those of Foreign Powers. The productions of these islands are all treated as those of a foreign county, and not with the favour which is generally shown to those of a colony; and some of their productions are virtually excluded from the markets of the United Kingdom by heavy duties which class them with those of foreign origin.
Ionian shipping is considered by our navigation laws, foreign property, and cannot, therefore, be admitted to the advantages and privileges enjoyed by colonial shipping, whilst in foreign ports, the shipping and commerce of these islands are liable to disadvan- tages by being considered British or Foreign, as the authorities interested may choose to decide.
The youth of these islands are not admitted into the army or navy of the protecting Power. The civil service of the protecting country is also shut against them, and the agents of Great Britian are the exclusive organs of all their consular and diplomatic trans- actions. The ordinary establishments of the Ionian States are, from such causes, necessarily charged with the maintenance of a vast number of the respectable and deserving youth of the country; and it is only just and politic, that in the absence of any other honorable career, military, naval, or commercial, the youth of the country should be more generally employed than would otherwise be called for.
The policy of France and Russia, when standing in similar relations with these States, was different. They permitted and encouraged Ionians to enter their service, and some natives of these islands have attained to high honors in the career they had chosen. The effects of this policy are seen and felt here, and both these countries have the warmest partizans in these islands, at the present day.
But it is more particularly with respect to the nature aud amount of the pecuniary obligations imposed upon these States, in their anomalous connection with Great Britian, that I would now solicit the most serious attention, and consideration of Her Majesty's
• That nothing essential to the stability of our tenure be omitted, it is necessary to observe, that the fortifications of this place. Corfu and Vido, are still in a very imperfect or unfinished state. The splendid works projected for Vido, will not, at the present rate of execution, be finished for some years. The citadel is not yet in a state of defence. Fort Neuf, the key of the roadstead or seaside is un- touched, and should we be caught in a political storm in such a state, disastrous consequences must ensue. Vide Despatch to Lord Glenelg of 21st April, 1836, No. 125; and ditto of 25th April same
year, marked private.
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- Government, For the pecuniary arrangement being now very generally discussed, relatively with the falling off of the revenue for the last year, and the recent withdrawing of a large portion of the military force from this station, (with fluctuations in either of which it is contended, the contribution should be made rateable) makes this a fit time, to submit the following observations on the principal amount, tendency and effect of that pecuniary obligation.
No colonial possession of Great Britain, having a legislative assembly, pays any part of its revenue into the military chest, to be appropriated by the Lords of the Treasury. Gibraltar and Malta are the only crown colonies which contribute in this way, by paying surpluses of revenue over civil expenditure into the military chest, in aid of military expenditure.
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Now supposing the £35,000 a year paid into the military chest by these States, to be a surplus revenue, they are, in this respect, put upon a footing with those crown colonies, one of which is a fortress, held exclusively as a naval and military station, the other a possession acquired by conquest.
Most of the colonial possessions of England provide, wholly or in part, for their civil lists, or pay, in some way or other, the salaries of those who are sent from England to rule and manage them; several of these possessions likewise provide, at their own charge, local corps to contribute to their military security, and remit, into the military chest, sums accruing from rents of crown or military lands and buildings, and other payments derived from colonial resources, and which sums (called "appropriations in aid") reduce by so much the gross charges incurred for the military expences of the colonies severally.
But whilst in these islands no crown property exists, they contribute (exclusive of their civil list, charges for the Lord High Commissioner, and the principal British functionaries) a larger sum towards their military expenditure than any of the colonies of Great Britain, excepting those which form together the Jamaica command, namely Jamaica, Bahama, and Honduras.
It does not appear to me, that these islands, as forming an independent State under the military protection of Britain, should be classed with the crown colonies, Malta and Gibraltar, and be designated as paying what is called surplus revenue into the military chest to be appropriated by the Lords of the Treasury, even if there were a real surplus.
Malta paid last year into the military chest, in aid of the expence of the Maltese regiment, in appropriation of surplus revenue accrued in 1836, £5,000; Gibraltar, about £12,000; Cape of Good Hope, £7,000; Mauritius, about £9,000; Bermuda, £3,000; all the Windward and Leeward Islands, forming one command, pay about £12,000; the Ionian Islands, £35,000; Jamaica, Bahamas, and Honduras, together, about £88,000 sterling.
To enable the Ionian Islands to pay their contribution, and the other charges in- cidental to British protection, a larger revenue is extracted from these States than, in their present condition, they can sustain. This is done by excessive duties upon ex- portation of their natural produce, and by which the burthens of taxation are distributed in a manner which, as I shall hereafter show, presses more heavily upon the industry of the country than in any other possession of Britain.
In the colony of Gibraltar there is no extent of country to improve; no demands upon the revenue for draining, making roads, and for all the other essential improvements which here demand more than the revenue can accomplish.
Malta is in a high state of cultivation, and the surplus, small though it be, which she pays, may fairly be considered a balance accruing beyond what is required for keeping the country in an industrious and wholesome condition; but, certainly, in these respects, no surplus revenue can be said to be forthcoming in these States.
The first form of the payments made by these States, on account of military pro- tection, was that of separate payments, which, though averaging nearly the amount of the present contribution, were, however, made at the convenience of the Government, ac- cording to the actual state of the treasury; and always with an expectation that, when the fortifications should be completed, the demands made upon it for military protection, would be reduced. Those separate grants were voted by the Legislative Assembly and the Ionian Government; and Parliament thereby retained the power of suspending such payments in the event of unfavorable seasons, or any other adverse circumstances.
By this arrangement there was a prospect, that the sum of £20,000 sterling per annum, voted by the Ionian Parliament for the erection of military works, would cease to be paid by the Ionian Islands whenever the fortifications of Corfu and Vido should be completed; but, according to the present arrangement, the contribution is permanent, and every prospect of relief seems to be precluded. In the former case, any reduction of military expenditure, that might be effected, would have been far the benefit of the Ionian Government, without detriment to the British treasury; whereas, by a fixed per- manent contribution, any diminution of military expenditure, as, for instance, the recent withdrawal of two regiments from the command, is exclusively to the benefit of the
•
Despatch Home, 18th January, 1838,"Confidential" Diminution of Troops, recommending their restoration.
* See Report on military expenditure.
Ispatch to Lord Glenelg, No. 3, January 18th, 1838.—Subject, Wines, &c.
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