PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE
Reference :-
C.O. 882
6 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON
ALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHIC- COPYRIGHT PHOTOGRAPH-NOT TO
Chinese know they will be treated justly, I am not, therefore, without hope that though handicapped as Weihaiwei now undoubtedly is, it may yet become possessed of a trade. If it were connected with the interior of Shantung by railway, I am inclined to believe that it would soon out-rival both Kiao-Chau and Chefoo, and I should be glad to hear that some other Power would construct such a railway which an understanding with Germany prevents Britishers from building." The following are extracts from a private letter from Mr. Lookhart, dated 18th April 1904:—
"This war will arrest development here. Several people who intended to put in hand some schemes have abandoned them for the present. As a result of my visit to Hong Kong, a Chinaman of good standing has been here to inspect the place and has returned quite convinced of its possibilities, but this war will, of course, delay matters.
There is much talk at present about our abandoning Weihaiwei. Cannot something be done to make it clear that we never — Convention or no Convention-intend to
abandon the place? I have just read that one of the Japanese Admirals states that Weihaiwei is worth twenty Port Arthurs, and should, without doubt, be fortified." The letter of the China Association to the Foreign Office of 20th May shows that commercial feeling is strongly in favour of the retention of Weihaiwei. Sir Thomas Jackson, late manager of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank at Hong Kong, who is second to none as a representative of Anglo- Chinese commercial interests, has spoken to me most strongly to the same effect.
A writer in the Fortnightly Review of March 1904, signing himself "Tai Foo," is very strong on the commercial possibilities of Weihaiwei. The port is far better than that of Chefoo: the country is fine and well cultivated, there should be industries of silk, bean oil and beancake: there are possibilities of gold.
It is the feeling of insecurity, he says, which prevents the investment of money in Weihaiwei. Otherwise the Chinese merchants of Hong Kong and Singapore would not hesitate to embark their money in the place. He also considers railway connection inland vital for the commercial future of the dependency.
The Superintendent of the Botanio Department in Hong Kong has just reported on the agricultural and afforestation possibilities of Weihaiwei. He notes that the place has productive land, willing inhabitants, and a good harbour, and finds possibilities in silk, fruit, vineyards, ground nuts, beancake, white war.
Apart from the main question of the tenure on which we hold Weihaiwei, the reason why we went there, and the complications to which the present
war has given rise, the following seem to be the respective disadvantages and advantages of holding it:*
Disadvantages :-
(a.) We have given out that we do not hold it for commercial purposes and we have given pledges militating against trade and revenue.
(b.) In consequence, it may be for some long time, possibly always, a charge to a small extent on the Imperial Exchequer.
(o.) The naval authorities—as already pointed out-do not seem to have come to
a final conclusion as to how far it is valuable; and the military authorities do not seem to have plased much store by it. War Office and Admiralty were quite ready to hand it over to the charge of the Colonial Office.
(d.) It is one more vulnerable point in the empire, if not fortified;" if fortified, it will be a source of anxiety and expense.
(6.) As far as is known, it has no rich country behind it, the development
of which, if we could get round our pledges as to not making railways inland, might bring great wealth to the place.
(f) It has been so handicapped by the uncertainty and half-heartedness which has been rightly or wrongly connected with it, that giving it up might be recognised as the logical outcome of what has gone before.
The advantages are as follows:-
(a.) The charge on the Imperial Exchequer for civil administration is infinitesimal. This year it is 6,0001. per annum, half what it was two years ago.
(b.) If the question of a small annual grant weighs at all, I do not doubt that Hong Kong would take the place over and run it as ■ dependency. We thought it better that Weihaiwei should be separate from Hong Kong. and it had better remain so for the present, but the other is a perfectly feasible alternative.
(c.) The harbour is admittedly the best in all the North China Ses. Looking to the future, are there any conosivable circumstances which would make it advisable, or even excusable that the first naval Power in the world, with great commercial interests in China, having acquired this harbour should give it up, especially when the harbour in question is close to, and alment