PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE
Reference :-
TELEC.O. 882
6 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON
ALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHIC- COPYRIGHT PHOTOGRAPH—NOT TO
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every man is his brother's keeper, and the responsibility of parents for the doings of their family is strictly enforced by immemorial usage. In short, nothing can ever happen in a Chinese village without at once incurring the intervention of the prin- cipals and their families of many generations, to say nothing of the intervention of all the neighbours, friends, relations and headmen. This spirit of family responsibility leads everyone to interfere as a matter of course and out of self-protection in all his neighbours affairs, for fear of the village being involved in trouble, and held collec- tively responsible to the District Magistrate. In the Wei-hai-wei district this organiza- tion is in excellent working order and immensely simplifies the village administration The headmen and villagers, too, support the system by expelling their own folk who insist on ganging, their own gait, and by refusing to allow any strangers to settle or wander as vagrants in the villages..
All that the civil power has to do is to strongly support the authority of the headmen, and through them hold the villagers responsible for any breach of the peace. As a matter of fact, very few offences against property or the person are emmitted in the district by the Chinese villagers. The offenders are nearly always disbanded Chinese troops and other bad characters from Chefoo or the Central Pre- fectures. It must be clear, therefore, that no large Civil Polic Force is required for policing purposes proper. In fact, a few extra mounted "ting chai," or office- messengers such as are now attached to the office of the Assistant Commissioner, would be sufficient. Nothing should be done to weaken the influence and authority of the beadmen in the villages, and for this reason, perhaps, it would be best to confine any extra police mes-engers to headquarters at Mahto, and not erect any police stations inland where a native police sergeant in charge might easily acquire influence and authority in antagonism to that of the village headmen) unless further experience how that it is really necessary for the protection of the villages.
With regard to the military protection of the territories and islands, there are different issues to be considered, and the two questions (policing the district by a civil police staff and providing military means for protecting the Settlement), should be kept distinct and considered apart.
Presuming that the War Office is decided to withdraw or disband the 1st Chinese Regiment, the question arises what military force, if any, it will be necessary for the Colony to provide at its own expense. This is a very important point, because the cost of a military garrison for Colonial purposes will be a heavy burden on the Home Treasury. The Parliamentary grant-in-aid is now approximately £12,000 a year. When all public werks are finished in 1904, this grant may be reduced to about £9,000 for current expenditure. But this excludes the cost of a new military garrison, for- merly Forne by the War Office. As there are no means of increasing the Colonial revenue in future to any appreciable extent, and reducing the home grant, it is clear that in establishing a military force economy must be the first consideration. The evidence and experience of the last three years shows very clearly that the mainland district is exceptionally free from crime and that the people are unusually well disposed and friendly to the British Authorities. The explanation of this is simply that the natural character of the Chinese peasants here is exceptionally peaceful and honest, and that there are no turbulent clans here continually fighting with each other as in the south of China, and that the district is isolated and independent, and not near any very large Chinese town. As far, therefore, as the preservation of order and the prevention of crime is concerned, the Colonial Government does not really require any military police in reserve for supporting the civil police. It must not be forgotten to that all Chinese villages are self-policed and self-governed in this way all over China, and that it is only in turbulent and unruly districts, where secret societies are rife and the unemployed and lawless criminal classes, bred from great towns, pre- lominate, that the Chinese Government itself falls back upon military force. It may be well to mention here that the Boxer anti-foreign movement had little or no influence on Wei-hai-wei, and that no anti-foreign feeling has been noted as yet in the district. From the above it follows that the Colonial Government requires a military guard not so much for actual police work as for the sake of upholding the national prestige of the Colonial Government, and being held as a power in reserve as a deterrent in energencies. Without some military force being held in reserve, Europeans would not regard the mainland as altogether safe. It would be best that this military force should. if possible, be British. The number is unimportant, as they would have no special duties to perform. In short, it is only the outward and visible presence of the British guard that is needed. Their military services, practically speaking, would
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probably not be required more than once or twice a year, if ever at all, in any special trouble where it might be advisable to support civil authority by a display of force. As a matter of fact, there is no necessity to maintain more than 50 privates, with one non-commissioned officer in charge on the mainland as a military guard for these particular purposes. On the island, which is the official headquarters of the British Government, no military guard would be required there in addition to the municipal police, as there are no Chinese on the island in a position to make trouble. As regards the general question of what display of military force is necessary to support the civil authority on the mainland, it must be remembered that the presence of British battleships in the Bay of Wei-hai-wei exercises a strong deterrent influence on the mainland against anything in the form of organized resistance to the established authority, and that the battles between the Chinese and Japanese warships in the harbour of Wei-hai-wei in 1896, and the occupation by Japan in 1896-1898 have left vivid and lasting impressions of the resources of foreign powers on the minds of the inhabitants of the leased area. Further, the sight of the British and Indian armed troops of the China expeditionary force, that made Wei-hai-wei their transport and hospital base in 1900 in the Boxer dsturbances, has also given the Chinese of the district a fair idea of the resources of the British Government. All this knowledge and these impressions has, apart from other reasons, tended to make it unnecessary to maintain more than a nominal Colonial military guard. It would undoubtedly be best if the Admiralty could arrange to station some 40 or 50 Marines at Mahto as a Colonial guard.
Failing this, the next best course would be to maintain a small body of 50 armed Sikhs, in charge of a native non-commissioned officer of good standing. Possibly the Government of India could arrange to detail men and an officer for this service, the Settlement paying the expenses of transport and maintenance. For several obvious reasons, which it seems unnecessary to go into, it would be inadvisable to employ Chinese as a military guard. A few of the corporals and sergeants of the 1st Chinese Regiment, natives of the district, whose conduct is good, and who can also furnish security for good behaviour, might, however, on the disbandment of the regiment, be taken on in the police force. The organization of the police and provision for
a military guard can only be carried out efficiently and economically on some such lines as those suggested above.
It is entirely unnecessary to do more for civil ends than what is advanced above, and for purposes of military protection and defence the small military guard suggested could always be reinforced at any moment if ever occasion should arise by a party of bluejackets from His Majesty's fleet in the bay.
The Mahto Municipality and Police.
70. The Municipality at Mahto has been carried on most economically and efficiently up to the end of 1901 by Mr. Schaller, the Chinese Secretary of the 1st Chinese Regiment (now retired). There are five Municipal coolies; three sweep the streets, one looks after the lamps, and one is a general messenger. The headman collects the house assessment and other fees, and supervises the work of the coolies. The monthly Municipal rent collected is about $50, and the expenditure is about $40. These Municipal coolies and the headman are also used as Civil Police by the District Magistrate. Practically the only disturbances, and they are few, that occur at Mahto are caused by the soldiers of the 1st Chinese Regiment quarrelling amongst them- selves, and it is now proposed to patrol the town with military police. It would be well to spend some money on Mahto and improve the sanitation there. Proper quarters for the Municipal staff have just been purchased by Government. The Municipal coolies should be put in proper uniform.
The four Chinese watchmen that now patrol the streets should be replaced by six policemen (when the new Civil Police Force is created), who should patrol the Bund Pier and main street at all times. Two Municipal coolies should be added, and be placed under the orders of the Colonial Surgeon to deal with the question of town refuse, removal of night soil, &c.
Government Printing.
71. There is no Government press at present, but a printing machine has lately been acquired by Government from a local firm, and it is proposed to engage a com- positor, who can be used as a clerk in the Commissioner's office when not employed at
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