431
50
arise if, as I fear must be anticipated, the proposals made this year by unofficial members of the Council are repeated in the enlarged Council of the future.
13. The amendment of the Ceylon Constitution now contemplated will confide the finances of the Colony, as well as the legislation, to a Council composed of 12 official and 37 unofficial members. The Governor will not ordinarily preside over the Council, but, when he does so, he will have an original and casting vote, and in that case (if all members are present), the total number of the original votes will be 50. If, therefore, not less than 12 unofficial members support the Government, the Governor's casting vote, added to his original vote, will be decisive. If, however, the Governor were not in the chair, and if the elected vice-President were (as might often be the case) opposed to the policy of the Government in an important matter under debate, then the total number of original votes would be 49, and it would be necessary that at least 13 unofficial members should vote with the Government in order to carry a Government measure. I have grave doubts whether, in a contentious matter such as, for example, the Salaries Scheme, 12 out of the 37 unofficial members would vote with the Government, and I fear there is good reason to expect that in most matters which become the subject of hostile agitation, in the newspapers, almost all unofficial elected members will vote against the Government.
14. I would emphasize, in this connexion, the fact that the opposition to the adequacy of remuneration in the higher branches of the public service is not confined to the extremists. The recent revival of discussion on the Salaries Scheme has shown that the most moderate-minded of the territorially-elected members of Council will vote in opposition to the Government on this subject, not necessarily from a convic- tion that salaries are excessive or that they impose a disproportionate burden on the Revenue, but from a reluctance to impair the solidarity of the votes of territorially- elected members on a matter which is regarded by the Congress and by certain sections of the Press as a fundamental political question. It is the present practice of the unofficial members, whenever a question of importance is about to come before the Council, or before Finance Committee, to meet privately together in advance and endeavour to arrive at unanimity among themselves as to the line of action to be adopted by them in public. Several such private conferences were held by the unofficial members in July and August in connexion with next year's Budget; and, when they agree thus among themselves, no facts or arguments presented publicly in debate have any influence on their votes.
15. Therefore, I look into the future with much apprehension, and it seems to me that, as in the next Council the Government members will be in a decided minority, some safeguards additional to those in the present Order in Council are essential. I have given the matter anxious thought, and I have carefully studied the precautions embodied in the Government of India Act, 1919 (9 and 10 Geo. V. Cap. 101), especially sections 11(3), 25(3), and 26(1). Those precautions are of two kinds. On the one hand it is provided as a financial safeguard that certain classes of expenditure, such as:—
(a) Interest and sinking fund charges on loans:
(b) Expenditure of which the amount is prescribed by or under any law:
(c) Salaries and pensions of persons appointed by or with the approval of
His Majesty or by the Secretary of State :-
(d) Salaries of the judges:
(e) Expenditure on defence:
shall not be submitted to the vote of the Legislature nor be open to discussion when the annual estimates are under consideration, unless the Governor-General otherwise directs. On the other hand, as regards legislation, it is provided that, if a Bill fails to pass in a form recommended by the Governor-General, then the Governor-General may certify that the passage of the Bill is essential for the safety, tranquillity or interests of British India, and in that case, on signature by the Governor-General, the Bill forthwith becomes an Act of the Indian Legislature in the form recommended by the Governor-General. While both these safeguards appear to be highly desir able, the introduction of the former, involving, as it does, a specific reservation of subjects, would be, in my opinion, impolitic at the present time. Local opinion is very strongly opposed to the adoption of the principle of dyarchy in any form, and for this reason I am not prepared to recommend it.
Action on the lines of the
second alternative mentioned does, however, appear to me to be practicable, and I strongly recommend it for your consideration. The weakness of the Governor's
position under the Ceylon Order in Council is dwelt upon both by the signatories to
51
the memorandum which forms an enclosure to this despatch, and also in the Colonial Secretary's minute of the 1st September. I would only add to what they state that in my view the danger they apprehend is a real one, and that from my experience of unofficial members of the Ceylon Legislative Council, I feel sure that they will be shrewd and capable enough to avail themselves of every advantage offered to them by the wording of section 52 of the Order in Council, 1920, in order to embarrass the Government and to make the use of powers of "paramount importance" extremely difficult and cumbersome. Moreover, it would, I think, as a rule be better that the Governor should intervene after, and not before, a vote of the Legislature has been taken, because this would enable :-
(a) A record to be made of the actual votes of the unofficial members and of
the extent to which they support Government.
(b) An unhurried review of the matter to be made by The Governor when the
votes and the reports of the debate were before him.
(c) Consultation to be made between the Governor and the Secretary of State, when desirable, before powers of "paramount importance" were exerted.
16. I do not consider that the democratic education of local politicians, and even less of the population of Ceylon as a whole, has yet reached a stage at which an elected majority can be trusted not to abuse the dominant position in which it will be placed in the next Legislative Council. Moreover, it is important to remember that the total electorate of the Colony, which at present numbers only 55,231, will, even with the enfranchisement of the Kandyan, Mohammedan and Indian communi- ties, fall far short of 100,000, out of an adult male population of 1,180,841 souls, and that therefore the representation of over 90 per cent. of the people will still be entrusted to the official and nominated members of the Legislative Council. For this reason, if excessive power is not to fall into the hands of a very small political minority, the Government must retain such constitutional safeguards as will enable it, in the last resort, to protect effectively the great mass of those to whom the franchise has not been, and cannot yet be, given.
17. I submit, for Your Grace's consideration, that the amendment to Clause 52
of the Order in Council, to give effect to the above proposals, might read as follows:-
"52 (1) If the Governor is of opinion that the passing of any Bill, or any clause of it, or of any amendment of such Bill, or of any resolution, or vote, is of paramount importance to the public interest, he may declare such Bill, clause, amendment, resolution or vote to be of paramount importance. Such declaration may be made by the Governor or by an ex-officio member of the Council acting by the authority and on the instruction of the Governor either before or after the votes of the members are taken.
(2) In any such case only the votes of the ex-officio members and nomin- ated official members shall be taken into consideration, and any such Bill, clause, amendment, resolution or vote shall be deemed to have been passed by the Council if a majority of the votes of such ex-officio members and nominated official members are recorded in favour of any such Bill, clause, amendment. resolution or vote."
I suggest this wording in order to make as little change as possible in the form of the clause as it now stands.
Enclosure 3 in No. 39.
I have. &c..
W. H. MANNING,
Governor, etc.
EXTRACT FROM THE OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE SPEECH OF THE HON. MR. E. W. PERERA. I FEEL all along a sense of unreality in this debate because the Government can marshal its official battalions and others of its allies to swamp us. But it will not always be 80. The next Council, I presume, will have this issue before it. I presume this issue will be before the electorate, too. It is not true statesmanship to have a perpetually running sore; and a sore cannot be cured by putting plasters over it. It is our duty to grasp the situation. The only way to do it is to frankly and freely face it. That can only be done, in my opinion, if we lose this motion, when
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