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Katukurunda. The Roman Catholic Father had the bell rung, and thousands of excited Christians turned out with arms. The report proved, however, to be false, and eventually the crowd dispersed. All the damage in the Moratuwa Peruwa, amounting to nearly Rs.430,000, was occasioned by people of the Peruwa and by groups of persons from Gorakana and other villages of Panadura Totamuna.
None of the important people of Moratuwa rendered valuable services in repressing the riots, and the sympathy of the headmen, with the solitary exception of the vidane Mohandiram, appears to have been with the mob; that this was recog- nized by the rioters is shown by the fact that not one of the headmen received a wound of any sort.
The only place where Moorish property escaped was in the Moorish village of Egoda Uyana. No Moors in the Peruwa were badly injured.
(b) The remainder of the Salpiti Korale Mudaliyar's Division,--The chief centre of damage outside of the Moratuwa Peruwa was at Piliyandara Town, where large boutiques situated in Kolamuna, Mampe, and Tunbovila villages were looted on the afternoon of the 1st by large crowds which assembled from all sides, › souse coming from Moratuwa and some along the minor road from Colombo. Here, too, the police and the headmen utterly failed to maintain order. As the crowds converged on Piliyandara they wrecked every Moorish boutique that came in their way. The shops at Katuwawala and Werahera were treated in this manner, whilst a body of rioters, led by men from Hewagam Korale, looted the Moorish boutique at Pelenwatta.
On the early morning of the 3rd the Moorish boutique at Batuwandara was attacked, and later in the day a Moorish bungalow at Siyambalagoda sustained some damage, whilst the devastation of the boutiques at Katuwawala and Mampe was completed.
The damage done was limited only by the amount of Moorish property available for destruction, and little or nothing escaped the fury of the mob.
B.--Damages.
26. The amount of damage done in the Colombo District, as assessed by the Special Commissioners, was found to be:-
Korale.
Hewagam
Hapitigam
Salpiti
Alut Kuru Korale North
Amount of Damage.
Rs.
229,120
75,862
620,483
190,623
Alut Kuru Korale South
40,880
Colombo Mudaliyar's division
288,270
Siyane Korale East
444,933
Siyane Korale West
570,727
Total
2,460,848
+
I annex a report by the Public Works Department officers who assessed the damages to buildings and arranged for the reconstruction and repairs.
C.-Origin, etc.
27. The chief points that strike me on reviewing my own experiences and on considering the sequence of events throughout the Colombo District are:-
The points of outbreak.
The foci of disturbance.
The rapid spread of the riots.
The manifold inducements held out to the people to participate.
The limitation of the outbreak to an attack on the Moors.
The conduct of the police.
The conduct of the minor headmen.
The conduct of the major headmon.
The weak points of Colombo.
The behaviour of the Christians.
Taking them in order :-
(a) The mechanics employed in the railway workshop a group of workmen who in the course of years appear to have got badly out of hand-applied the first match to the train. As they left the works on the 31st May their demeanour was
285
devoid of all respect for such of their superior officers as were present or for the authorities. The signs of ferment near Ambepussa railway station on the 31st point to the success of the agitators of the Hapitigam Korale, who for years past have, I believe, been inculcating disloyalty through the agency of associations established ostensibly in connexion with the cause of temperance.
(b) The foci of disturbance on the 1st June, viz., Colombo, Angulana, Veyan- goda, and Mirigama, again point to the intimate relation between the railway and the riots. The leaders evidently realized to the full the advantage given to them by a means of transport which permitted of their emissaries being distributed rapidly and without suspicion throughout the district.
(c) The speed with which the disturbances spread and the manner in which the villagers were called out undoubtedly point to careful preparation many months in advance, and to the fact that a general plan of operations had been thought out and that the people were only waiting for a sign to start. I am, however, inclined to agree with the view that the outbreak was premature, having originally been intended to occur in August.
(d) Another proof of preparation is to be found in the many lures held out to For the riffraff the attraction was entice all classes to join in the disturbances.
loot pure and simple, for the petty villagers there was revenge to be taken on the Moors for their commercial avidity, racial hatred and religious rivalry were power- ful incentives for the more intelligent, whilst the better educated regarded the occurrence as a means of testing the strength and determination of Government. False tales of revenge to be taken by the Moors for the indignities put upon them, of the desire of the British Government to see the Moors-the co-religionists of the Turks expelled, of the sympathy of the Governor with Buddhism, of the expiry of the century of dominion in Ceylon assigned by fate to the British Empire, were all so cunningly circulated and utilized to stir up the masses as to demonstrate beyond doubt the existence of careful organization. It is certain that for some consider- able time a regular propaganda has been carried out with a view to create a Sin- halese national spirit and to stir up interest in the Gampola judgment and collect moneys for an appeal to the Privy Council. The care with which the ringleaders kept in the background, and the few copies of leaflets found in the many searches made, all indicate that the preparation had been made by men who were desirous of taking every precaution to prevent detection and not by individuals under the impulse of casual excitement.
(e) The riots at first sight would appear to have been organized to deal a blow at the prosperity of the Moorish section of the community only. The reasons advanced for such conduct seems to have been :-
(a) Trade jealousy.
(6) Religious animosity.
(c) Racial hatred, especially of the coast Moormen as distinguished from the Moors domiciled for centuries in Ceylon; but it is significant to note that the pamphlets published in connexion with the propaganda do not refer to Moors only but to all foreigners. It is therefore clear that the expulsion of the Moors was considered by those who engineered the riots merely as a step in their plan of campaign. (How deep a root disaffection had taken is shown by the conduct of the police in Colombo and elsewhere. It is true that, when the riots broke out, the soundest part of the police force was not in the Western Province, but it was nevertheless very startling to see what a hold the leaders of the riots had secured, over the Sin- halese police, and to observe the sympathy shown by the latter in respect of the dis- turbances a sympathy which in some cases grew into an active participation with the looters. There is no doubt that, had the police shown a determination to do their duty, and had there been a sufficiency of senior officers available to give them the necessary stiffening, the riots would not have assumed such large proportions.
(9) Equally surprising was it to find the minor headmen not only failing to put themselves on the side of order but actually placing themselves at the head of the rioters in the attacks on many of the more important bazaars and Moorish villages. This could never, I believe, have happened had they not been confident of the sup- port of the higher headmen. As soon as martial law was proclaimed these minor officers realized the mistake they had made, and, executing a rapid volte-face, commenced an energetio prosecution of the minor rioters, who, strange to say, allowed themselves to be condemned without ever betraying the headmen.
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(h) The conduct of the Mudaliyars and Mohandirams was still more extra- ordinary. These officers were men selected from the more important and well-to-do families with the idea that their position would give them great power and With authority and enable them to influence the native population for good. regard to the riots these officers maintain that they knew nothing beforehand. When account is taken of the facts that the minor headmen not only were frequently office-bearers in the associations that engineered the riots, and were consequently well aware of the impending outbreak, but also took active part in inciting the people to attack the Moors, it is clear, either that the Mudaliyars and Muhandirams were out of touch with their subordinates and had no idea of the approaching storm, or else that they knew of it but failed to give Government any hint of it. find it impossible to believe that a conspiracy of this widespread nature partici- pated in by the minor headmen could possibly have existed without the higher head- men being aware of it. This is also, to my mind, proved by their apparently pusil- lanimous conduct in dealing with the riots and by their failure (in almost every case) to protect and preserve the property of the Moors. My own belief is that, if these officers had acted boldly and exerted their undoubted influence, no riots out- side of Colombo would have taken place, or only on a very small scale. Amongst such a number of influential men, and men whom I should certainly hesitate to regard as cowards, it is striking to find such uniformity of conduct in yielding to the wishes of the mobs. Had it not been prearranged I should have expected to find two or three notable exceptions in the shape of Mudaliyars and Muhandirams who preferred to risk life and limb in the performance of their duty and the main- tenance of their honour and position. The absence of any such stand-out case, and the fact that only one of them received a trifling injury, seems to me to indicate that the majority of them were aware of the impending outbreak, that they did not give warning to Government, that they failed to exercise their influence on the side of order, and that they all, or nearly all, acted in such a uniformly pusillanimous manner as to force one to the conclusion that such an action had been premeditated or prearranged.
(1) My experience of the riots in Colombo Town convinced me of
(a) the difficulty of dealing effectively with large and hostile mobs in
narrow and irregular lanes and streets;
(b) the importance of preventing the incursion of large bands from outside;
and
(c) the danger of using troops at one point in such an extensive town as Colombo before provision had been made for the safety of the other parts by the establishment of pickets at points of vantage.
The military authorities, in conjunction with the police, might usefully draw up a plan for the protection of the town in time of riots. Combined with this might be a scheme for Hausmannizing Colombo-desirable from all administrative points of
view.
28. Holding, as I do, the view that the riots were the somewhat premature result of plans carefully laid by men of education and of wealth, who were cunning enough to advance manifold reasons to induce the various sections of the Sinhalese to defy the law and who were powerful enough to secure the sympathy of the police and of the headmen, I find it difficult to believe that the whole scope of these men's schemes was the destruction of the property of Moormen and even their 'expulsion from the island. No man of education could embark on a movement such as the late riots without realizing
(a) that it was unlawful;
(b) that punishment would follow want of success; and
(c) that success alone, as a step to further action, could justify the under-
taking.
No body of disaffected plotters would take such risks to secure the expulsion of the Moors alone.
29. I believe that these leaders had ulterior political objects in view. Such schemes, I admit, must seem to us to be far from sane, but if we take into account the gigantic self-conceit of the educated Sinhalese, their want of a due sense of historical perspective and proportion, the excess of wealth which they have acquired in late years, and their innate love of plotting and intrigue, there is nothing unlikely, I think, in the view that the persons responsible for the riots aimed at something more than the overthrow of the Moors. It must not be forgotten what a startling
287
effect the sight of the destruction or even expulsion of the Moorish community in Ceylon would present to the millions of Moslems in India, the British Government standing by unable to protect and impotent to punish.
30. To my mind the recent events were a sort of ballon d'essai, launched to see what Government would do. The Sinhalese were to set upon a section of the community, destroy its property, and force it to quit Ceylon. Suitable excuses were to be made for such action-religious differences would be a satisfactory mask. Buddhism disapproves of the taking of life, therefore let no life be taken at first. The British Empire was at war, the garrison was weak, many Europeans had gone to fight, the British were degenerate (the Germans had said so), the Germans were going to win.
What will the Ceylon Government be able to do? It will be filled with fear at this universal rising; it will hesitate to resort to force; it will appeal to the leaders, who will make their own terms, terms which would protect all from punishment and leave the Sinhalese with all the prestige of a successful revolt.
31. Some such idea there was, I have no doubt, in the mind of the schemers responsible for the riots-probably not exactly as I have suggested, but undoubtedly somewhat on these lines. Beyond this point I do not think anything definite had been planned. Everything in the future would depend on the measure of success that attended the launching of the ballon d'essai.
32. Probably, as soon as the incentives mentioned in paragraph 27 (d) above had induced the masses to place themselves beyond the pale of the law and had resulted in the attainment of their primary objective, the leaders would appear on the scene, point out to the rioters how gravely they had compromised themselves, and urge them to complete the work, as punishment in case they should be unsuccessful would be inevitable whether they simply rioted or played the part of traitors.
33. To what is such an extraordinary occurrence to be attributed? Primarily to the growth of a class of nouveaux riches who have too much money and too few These people principles, who desire to shine, or at any rate to attain notoriety. know quite well the power of money and the readiness of human nature to believe what is false and bad. The present is also a period of unrest. Everyone is specu- Then, again, the lating on the changes which the war will bring in its train. administration has become more concentrated in offices. The villager sees less of the Government officials than before: he is left more in the hands of the principal head- men. In some cases these headmen, owing to their riches and to a badly assimilated Western education, are suffering from an exaggerated idea of their importance and are not as loyal as could be desired. The Government schoolmasters appear to have been more zealous in fostering disaffection than in encouraging healthy Imperial aspirations; much might be done, and ought, to be done, to improve the ethics of the Sinhalese as a race: too much importance seems paid to producing clerks and too little to producing men of character. The system of unpaid headmen is tottering It is undesirable to accept the to its fall. The sooner it is abolished the better. services of headmen without paying them. Everyone knows that under the present system they take bribes for almost everything they do for which a special regulation fee is not fixed. They receive no training except desultory instruction of a frag- mentary nature from the Mudaliyars. They have no esprit de corps. They should be replaced by a body of respectable men, chosen by the Government Agents, and trained with the greatest care. As we have seen, there is too much money in the country for its good, and if a little taxation is imposed on the rich the means for paying the headmen' can easily be provided. The police should also be put in a position to supervise the native Press and to watch the movements of political suspects.
34. Statement " A "* shows the number of Moors murdered and the rioters shot in the Colombo District, exclusive of Colombo Town.
35.
All damages have been assessed by the Special Commissioners after careful personal inquiry on the spot. Stens have been taken to have all the mosques that have been damaged, renaired, or rebuilt, as soon as possible. I annex a plant of the The arrows indicate, Colombo District to illustrate the damage done to the Moors.
as far as I have been able to ascertain, the main movements of the rioters. I also append, in a separate envelope, some photographst showing the nature of the damage inflicted.
36.
In conclusion, I would submit, for the information of Government. the excellent work done by Mr. C. V. Brayne on the 1st of June, when be commanded
* Not printed.
Not received in Colonial Office.