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54. A not unlikely theory appears to me to be that the recent outbreak was contemplated by the seditionists simply as an experiment-a trial of their strength. Should they be successful in raising the country, defying the authorities, and effecting their immediate object of expelling the Moors with impunity, other more serious matters might be taken in hand later. Should they find the Government too strong, they themselves, the real mischief-makers, hoped to crawl back into obscurity, leaving their dupes to bear the punishments.
55. An interesting light is thrown upon this matter by evidence, which we collected with great difficulty and from a large variety of sources, of a speech made at Hanwella on the 2nd June. The place had been the centre of serious disturbances all day, the mosque had just been wrecked and dynamited by an armed mob, and large numbers of armed and excited villagers were still congregated in the bazaar, which had been looted on the 1st. A motor-car arrived from Colombo containing four well-known Sinhalese gentlemen, whose names I need not mention here. car stopped, and the mob collected round it and asked to sit down, and speeches were made. The
Pith
of these speeches, given freely, was as follows:--
The
You know us; we are the friends of the Sinhalese people, and have come out bere in your interests. We have addressed many similar meetings to-day, and have others to address, so must press on.
1
You have done well. You have exacted vengeance on the Moors for the insults they have given the Sinhalese people. You have shown what a united Sinhalese people can effect.
"You must not, however, go any farther for the present. Martial law has been proclaimed, and if you go on you will be all shot, so lay down your weapons and go home." This speech was received with great applause, the people shouting "Sadhu and firing guns.
35
56. It is not impossible, also, that certain political agitators may have thought that if sufficient trouble could be created the Government, finding itself not strong enough to restore order, would appeal to them, as persons known to have influence with the people, to pacify the mobs and get them back to their homes. Having suc- ceeded in doing so they would then be in a strong position to represent that the outbreak was the outcome of the denial of the people of certain political privileges, and that they, the leaders and men of influence, could not be responsible that worse things would not happen if the concessions they demanded were longer withheld.
57. More than one incident during the riots suggests this theory. On the 1st of June, when the streets of Colombo were approaching a state of chaos, a Sinhalese Government officer, and an ardent Buddhist, suggested to me that the course pursued by the Government Agent in calling out the military and using force was absolutely wrong and foolish. What he ought to do was to send for such and such people, mentioning prominent Sinhalese-who, I believe, have since been arrested-and get them to speak to the people and quiet them!
58. Again in the evening, shortly after the mob had been fired on and scattered, a Sinhalese Municipal Council member came and asked my leave to hold a meeting, as a prominent Buddhist priest had arrived to address the people and persuade them to go home.
refused permission for any meetings to be held at that stage.
Needless to say
59. Again, the party referred to in paragraph 55, which made speeches at Hanwella, had, I believe, obtained permission of the Mayor of Colombo to go out in a car and speak to and quiet the people.
60. From such incidents it would certainly appear that prominent persons, to whose machinations we may shrewdly suspect the trouble was mainly due, were quite ready to pose as possessing more power than the authorities to control the mob, and quite willing to exercise such power if asked to do so.
81. It is also probable that amongst the organizers were a number of Buddhists who had no aim beyond creating a demonstration against the final judgment in the Gampola case, hoping thus to bring pressure upon the Government to grant a fuller recognition of Buddhist rights. The movement, augmented, as we have seen, by the efforts of active seditionists, probably went far beyond what these Buddhist pro- moters anticipated. The influence of the latter may, indeed, account for the efforts made to preserve the Moors from personal violence whilst looting their property and driving them ont.
62. A further interesting question, already just touched on, is whether the rising was planned for the dates upon which it actually occurred or whether it broke out prematurely. For the former alternative it may be argued that it may very well have been deliberately planned that the outbreak in Kandy should precede that in Colombo, the mischief-makers calculating in that way to draw away a large and effective portion of the Police Force, and possibly some of the military also, from the metropolis. And this, indeed, is what actually happened.
63. In favour of the latter theory, which appears to me the more probable, it may be observed that, had the rising taken place exactly in accordance with a pre- arranged plan, one would have expected a simultaneous outbreak in every part of the country. Such a rising would have rendered the authorities still more powerless to deal with it effectively. Instead of this the riots extended over several days and spread from one part of the country to another, thus rendering the task of sup- pressing them considerably easier. Again, although the disturbances showed that the ground had been carefully prepared, organization was by no means complete, and the outbreaks appeared sporadic rather than worked up on any definite plan. Besides this it appears that the systematic raising of the country by false rumours in the Colombo District was effected too late. Had this been done on the 1st, and the metropolis filled with 10,000 to 20,000 armed villagers before the military estab lished a cordon to keep them out, things in Colombo might have been much more serious than they were.
64. Again, though numbers of railway employees were amongst the worst of the rioters, and, in fact, started the trouble in Colombo, no general strike had been organized to synchronize with the outbreak of disturbances, and was only engineered by the mischief-makers some days afterwards. Such a strike, which might have seriously handicapped the authorities in sending police or military to various points, one would have expected to be a part of any organized programme.
65. In the confidential letter calling for this report Commissioners are invited. after dealing with the origin and scope of the recent disturbances, to add any other remarks they may wish to make. It is hoped, therefore, that it will not be thought presumption on my part to make the few following observations. It must be admitted that the late outbreak has discovered one or two weaker points in our administra tion. It cannot be denied that it took the authorities almost completely by surprise and consequently unprepared, and that for two days they were powerless to cope with it over a large part of the country. In fact, Colombo, during 1st and 2nd June, required the whole of our attention, and the district, in spite of frantic appeals for assistance from every direction, had to take care of itself.
66. Second, it revealed the lamentable fact that a large number of hitherto trusted Sinhalese Government officers were quite unreliable in such an emergency. if not positively disloyal.
67. It further revealed a considerable and dangerous seditious propaganda. both by literature and the agency of societies, of which the authorities hitherto had either been unaware or had under-estimated the significance.
68. It has further emphasized a fact already known, that the turbulence of a section of the railway employees may prove at any critical time a source of serious danger to the Colony.
69.
The recent outbreak has also revealed that in many instances those in charge of educating the rising generation are amongst the most disloyal in the community. It is needless to urge that such a state of affairs demands the most serious reflection if the loyalty of the Sinhalese as a race is not seriously to be undermined.
70. Another source of danger may be touched on, though the remedy for it is by no means easy to suggest. There appears little doubt that the engineering of the recent riots was largely the work of rich upstarta, men till recently of no position, but to whom the abounding prosperity of the Colony, or mere accident, has brought more wealth than they know what to do with and a position which they have forthwith proceeded to abuse.
71. One might add that the ignorant villager, who is governed very much by outside show, had in places been dazzled by the display of wealth and power of these inen, until he began to consider that these were the people who really governed the country, and not the comparatively insignificant Government official. However that may be, the power of such men to raise the whole country and considerably to embarrass the authorities has been demonstrated. Having succeeded once they may naturally be expected to try another similar experiment unless their powers of mischief-making are curtailed