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To be especially careful that your Lordship's injunctions were firmly carried out, and that the Chiefs who had signed the engagement were strictly held to the terms they solemnly agreed upon; to investigate any violation thereof; and to warn them of the

sequences of such violation.

37 A regards the first point, Ismail, impelled, doubtless, by motives and feelings such as I have stated in paragraph 29, and recognising that his position was even Stronger than it was at the time of the Pangkore engagement, received Mr. Birch as the gent of the British Government attached to Abdullah. An apparent civility, a well- fisguised courtesy of manner, and a pretended acquiescence, concealed a strength of purpose, a feeling of injury, and a stern resolution not to part with that which he had acquired. As intractable as he was civil, as obstinate as he was courteous, and as firm as he was seemingly acquiescent, he could not be induced by any persuasion or argument to adopt the decisions of the British Government, nor to yield the high position which he occupied. His very ignorance and dependence upon his counsellors rendered him even still more difficult to deal with.

38 Notwithstanding, however, that the resistance made by Ismail was strictly passive in its nature, Mr. Birch found that, in the large district in which Ismail was acknowledged, he was unable, in his capacity as Resident, to initiate reforms and to effect changes in the name of a Sultan who was not recognized therein as such, but who was rather Nor could he do so in the name of the Ex-Sultan, regarded with jealousy and dislike.

for he would then have confirmed the position to which Ismail was aspiring, and would have acted in opposition to the general purpose of the Pangkore engagement, and to the expressed injunctions of Her Majesty's Government. Nevertheless, he had his duties as Resident to perform in this district; to repress disorder, and to bring about a more settled state of things; and this he had to endeavour to do without augmenting the jealousy which existed between the two parties.

39. It must, moreover, be borne in mind that, in endeavouring to effect these objects, he found that the Chiefs, although owning nominal allegiance to one or other of the two Sultang, who divided the head authority between them, were semi-independent, and had to be dealt with directly. Had the ruling power been a strong one, or had the Resident been able to act in the name of one central authority, there is no doubt but that this semi-independence would have disappeared.

40. By taking up the position assigned to him by his instructions, Mr. Birch was enabled to do much towards carrying out the second duty ((2) paragraph 36) which as Resident he had to perform, and, to his credit, I may say that in the twelve months during which be held the post of Resident illegal extortion and exaction and the levying of black mail greatly diminished. Now, although the ryots could not fail to recognise the protection which they gained from the presence of a British Officer, and in the course adopted by him in putting down extortion and black mail, a relief from a burden against which they dared not complain, the Chiefs, on the other hand, doubtless regarded such proceedings as encroachments on the power which they had exercised.

It is not to be wondered at that they were loath to surrender their power, and that Mr. Birch, in virtue of the instructions issued to him (paragraph 14), was often obliged on failure of persuasion, to have recourse to threats of force. Nor is it to be wondered at, that, in consequence, Mr. Birch was regarded by some of the Chiefs, whose power he had curbed, with ill-feeling and distrust.

41. And to none of these Chiefs did the new order of things prove probably more dis- tasteful than to the Maharaja Lela. He had not been concerned in the Pangkore treaty, and holding as head of the "Eight," a most important position in the State, he doubt- less felt annoyed and slighted that other Chiefs had entered into this engagement without consulting him. For 10 months, however, British intervention, confined as it was to Laroot, was not brought to bear upon him. Impelled, doubtless, by feelings of annoyance and pique, he had, during this time, the opportunity of cementing a friendship with Ismail, although, in February 1972, he had been one of the Chiefs who addressed a letter to the Governor, urging the claims of Abdullah to the throne.

42. I have twice mentioned that Ismail's position was stronger in November 1874 than it was at the time of the Pangkore engagement. This is mainly due to the fact that no step was taken to establish Abdullah in his position, nor to strengthen that position by the presence of a Resident for some 10 months. Had the Pangkore engagement been immediately acted upon, and had Abdullah then received the moral support of a Resident, perhaps many subsequent difficulties would never have arisen, whilst, as it was, the delay which ensued detracted from the solemn importance with which the engagement should

See page 129 Blue Book, Native States Affairs.

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Gave been regarded by the Chiefs who had contracted it. During this interval, the Bandahara, the Tumonggong, and the Mantri, neither of whom had been very warm supporters of Abdullah, practically abandoned the cause of Abdullah and espoused that it Ismail, whilst the Datu Sagor wavered between the two Sultans.

Raja Muda Yusuf who, until 1874, had never even met Ismail, whilst declaring him- selt to be the rightful Sultan, repudiated Abdullab and associated himself with Ismail. l'here remained, therefore, but the Laxamana, the Shahbandar, and the Rajah Makola 48 supporters of Abdullah.

43. Such was the position of the Chiefs, as regards the nominal allegiance which they wed to the two heads, who, together, constituted the central authority.

I may remark that such alliegance did not necessiate active support, in fact, during recent events, Rajah Muda Yusuf has actively supported us, and the Bandabara, the Tumonggong, and the Mantri have afforded us assistance in more or less degree.

11. Ismail's position was still more strengthened by the declared allegiance of the Maharaja Lela. Living as the latter did at Passir Sala, the point of division of the upper and lower districts, he was the first to feel the presence and power of the Resident, when British intervention was brought to bear in Perak. He also, doubtless, felt some con- tempt for the position of Abdullah, supported as he was but by three Chiefs, each of whom were inferior in rank to himself. He probably regarded Mr. Birch as an intruder and as an agent of Abdullah, and, no doubt, he viewed the abolition of illegal taxes and black mail, as practised at Passir Sala, with exasperated feelings.

Exasperation gave rise to insolence, and Mr. Birch, who from the Residency at Bandar Bahru, could always keep a watch over his actions, experienced greater trouble and obstruction from him than from any other Chief in Perak. I shall allude again to this point when considering your Lordship's observation that my proceedings in Perak were the " signal for resistance and attack."

15. In paragraph 40, I bave stated that Mr. Birch was, in a considerable measure, successful in putting down illegal extortion and exaction in Perak, and that he was, in

curence, regarded with ill-feeling and distrust by the Chiefs whose power he bad

But any resistance to his proceedings was, as a rule, similar to that offered by Ismail, in his relations with the Resident, viz., passive. This was probably due more to the jealousy which existed between the several Chiefs and their followers, and the almost impossibility of their uniting for a common object, rather than to any individual feeling In the matter.

Arrangements had not been perfected for indemnifying the principal Chiefs and rulers for loss of power and profit, and many of them, no doubt feared that British intervention, which brought gain to the ryots, meant loss to them. At the same time, they probably lid not individually feel themselves in a position openly to oppose the reformatory measures effected by the Resident.

46. It is to be observed that the Resident could only carry out the measures necessary for the good government of the country in the name of Abdullah, and with his consent and approval. Now, as I have mentioned in paragraph 32, Abdullah was not recognised as Sultan in the Ulu, and any measures introduced therein in his name had naturally the effect of increasing the jealousy between the two parties and of encountering opposition from Ex-Sultan Ismail and his Chiefs. Mr. Birch was naturally anxious to carry out such measures in the Ulu, as is shown by some of the extracts from his report to which I have alluded in paragraph 19, but at the same time, it would have been a task of difficulty, and one in which the name of Abdullah would have had to be used as sparingly great as possible.

47. Thus, even had Abdullah, as bitherto presumed, been perfectly amenable to the counsels of the Resident, your Lordship will observe that the diision of parties in the State of Perak, was fatal to the successful working of the Residential system, as carried on in the States of Salangore and Sungie Ujong, in each of which there is a central authority, in whose name the Residents can practically carry on the administration of affairs. In Perak, such action was rendered impossible by the absence of this necessary central authority one division of the country and that the most considerable one, recog- nising neither the Sultan as elected at Pangkore, nor his authority to sanction the intro- duction of the reforms and changes necessary for the improvement of the country and the welfare of its inhabitants.

48. And here I would observe that the failure of the Residential system in Perak, so far as it arose from the division of parties, was quite independent of any action or general line of conduct of either the Resident or of Abdullah, but that it arose purely from the fact of there being this division of parties, with their mutual jealousy, distrust, and antagonism.

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