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I am satisfied, from Hadji Alli's reported connexion with the Chiefs on both sides, from the fact of his having been in communication with Ismail since Mr. Birch's death, from the report of his having been in the stockade at Passir Sala, and from the fact of his having been arrested at the village, where were Abdulla and his principal adherents (the Laxamana and the Shahbandar),—with arms and ammunition in his possession, that be can, if he will, furnish us with very important information.
13. Your Lordship will see that although I believed, and still believe, that the attack upon Mr. Birch was not premeditated, yet that from the communications received by me, copies of which are forwarded with Despatch No. 334, there is abundant reason for suspecting, until there is evidence to the contrary, that there was a smothered feeling of hostility towards us, which such an event was likely to cause to break out into an undisguised attack upon us from on all sides.
14. After my arrival at the Perak River on the 8th instant, immediately after the repulse which was experienced by our troops on the occasion of the first attack on Passir Sala, I felt that the situation was critical.
On my return to Singapore on the 11th, I was cheered by the telegram which I received from your Lordship in which your Lordship authorised me to call for troops from India, and having reference to the state of things which was reported to me from the other native States, more especially from Mr. Davidson in Salangore, looking more- over at the possibility of attack being made on our own possessions in the Malay Peninsula, viz., Province Wellesley, and even our own old settlement of Malacca, I not only fully endorsed the telegram which was sent by the Acting Colonial Secretary, after consulting the Chief Justice and the Members of the Executive Council, but I added to it by asking that a larger force might be sent.
15. I have explained, in answer to your Lordship's inquiries, as fully as I could do so by telegraphic communications (which, no doubt, your Lordship has received by this time), my objects and reasons for asking for the force for which I made requisition, Besides what I have already stated, I felt that, in addition to Mr. Birch's murder and the complicity of certain Chiefs in the matter, of which there could be no doubt, our troops had sustained a defeat, and that this might raise all the disaffected spirits to join în opposition to our just requirement that all concerned in Mr. Birch's murder should be punished. Had the first attack been successful, and had there been no further probability of resistance, there would perhaps have been no necessity for more than a small reinforce- ment, but it was the fact that the attack had not been successful, and that the situation was such as I have described, that rendered the demand for a comparatively large force
necessary.
16. Your Lordship will perceive that I can only place absolute reliance on two or three of the Chiefs of Perak, and the people are at present subject to the call of their Chiefs. I felt that even if it were open to us to retire from Perak, and to withdraw altogether from any interference in its affairs, that it was essential that Mr. Birch's murderers should be punished and that too with promptitude.
The Sultan Abdullah and his Chiefs, while professing their willingness to inflict punish- ment on the offenders stated their inability to do so.
We were unable to trust them to raise followers or to supply them with arms.
I could then get no communication either with Ismail or any of the Chiefs of the upper country, as the Chiefs of the lower country professed to be unable to get a letter to the "Ulu.'
Then there was the disturbed condition of a large part of the rest of the Malay Peninsula, already referred to, and reports reached me implicating most of the Chiefs throughout Perak. I did not see how, apart from a display of force, we were, under these circumstances, to insist upon justice being done upon those concerned in these outrages, nor how we could ever arrive at a correct conclusion as to who was concerned until we had occupied the country, and strengthened our friends as well as dispirited our enemies. If it be true that the Chiefs of the lower country are endeavouring to fasten the blame on the Chiefs of the upper country, and vice verså, we may expect them to come to mutual recriminations, and possibly we may find out the truth.
We can however expect no evidence from third parties until we show that we can pro- tect them against the consequences of furnishing us with information which may be disagreeable to any of the chiefs.
Apart from the punishment of those implicated in the outrages, however, I did not think it was possible for us to recede on such an occasion from the position we had taken up in reference to Perak affairs.
17. Your Lordship will observe that the reinforcements already sent may have had the effect of preventing many who were hostile to us from declaring themselves our enemies,
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The effect of these reinforcements would naturally be to induce those living near Fassir Sala who were wavering to await before they cast in their lot with the dissaffected at that place.
The effect of the success gained by the subsequent combined attack, the fact of the further reinforcements that have since arrived at Bandar Bahru, the presence of several vessels in the Perak River, and the knowledge that troops, the number probably vastly exaggerated,--are coming from India, have no doubt had a good effect, and probably have prevented, and will prevent, many throughout the country from declaring against us, who would doubtless have done so if they had conceived that it was impossible for us to strike a blow in the interior and occupy the country. My belief is now, and I am strengthened in that belief by the reports I receive, that beyond the resistance that is to be expected from the Maharajah Lela and those implicated with him, the bare fact of our having been able to obtain a sufficient force will overswe opposition, and that we shall be permitted to occupy the country without fighting. It is probable that all the Chiefs not known to be concerned will now disown any implication in the murder of Mr. Birch, or complicity in the resistance offered to our attack upon Passir Sala. Whether this would have been the case if we had not shown a sufficient amount of force is another question. I think not, and I still deem it wise to take the utmost precautions, as I consider it possible that resistance may still be offered.
18. I am, however, desirous as far as possible of acting in the contrary supposition, and your Lordship will see the spirit in which I have proceeded in the Proclamation, the Notification, and the letters which I have addressed to the principal Chiefs, as also in the Instructions given to the Commissioners and communicated to the Naval and Military authorities.
19. I think that the forces which have been supplied are sufficient.
The number sent from India will amount altogether to about 1,200 men.
Your Lordship will see from my telegram of the 23rd ult., that matters not appearing so serious as at first reported, I considered that about 1,000 men from India might suffice. The altered circumstances to which I referred were, that I had ascertained that the strength which Ismail could bring into the field, if he intended opposition, was much over estimated. Affairs in Salangore also were in a more satisfactory condition.
20. in order to occupy the country in such a manner as to enable me to negociate with the best chance of success, it is necessary that several points along the Perak River should be held, and that there should still be a disposable force ready for active
moverment.
As I stated in my telegraphic Despatch of 18th November, whilst one body of troops moves up the Perak River, another entering Perak through Laroot will occupy Qualla Kangsa, and from thence move down the stream, Detachments from these two forces will be left at different points on the river. At the same time a force will move from the coast near the Island of Pangkore, through the Jungle, upon a point about midway between the upper and lower strearm forces. In this manner the country will be entirely under control. Supposing Her Majesty's Government desire that, after negociations, Perak should be permanently occupied, about 1,000 men would be required to be left there for, say, two or three months, whilst we have roads cut through the jungle from the coast to the River Perak. When these roads are cut, about 500 men would suffice, and these might gradually be reduced as the country became settled.
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21. The country is rich in minerals, and has great capabilities for growing tea, coffee, tapioca, tobacco, sugar, pepper, rice, and all kinds of tropical products.
If taken by us no doubt a stream of Chinese immigration would set in, and plenty of capital, both Chinese and British, would be available for opening up the country.
Your Lordship will observe that in all the communications which I have issued, both public and private, I have not said one word as to the policy that is hereafter to be pursued. The Residential policy was instituted before I came to the Straits Settlements and I am not responsible for it. So long as the advice of the Resident was taken, pro- bably no particular difficulties would arise between the adviser and the advised. One effect, however, of adopting the Residential system has been that, if for no other reason than the protection of our own officer, we find ourselves obliged to afford material as well an moral support in the States where Residents are stationed. 'It has always appeared to me that it would, sooner or latter, be found impossible to stop at the point of advice, and that it was only a question of time when control in some shape must follow.
22. I have fully explained, in my Despatch of October 16th, my reasons for considering that it was necessary in Perak to take an immediate step in advance, and that without waiting for a communication from your Lordship upon the subject. It seemed to me to be so
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