PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE
Reference :--
882
FPEICO.
3
PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON
ALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHIC- COPYRIGHT PHOTOGRAPH—NOT TO
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of popular support. But however this may be, you proceed to state that the system. under which the Resident had acted had produced an unsatisfactory result, and that some of the Chiefs wished the British Government to take the country altogether under their control. If, indeed, the system has proved a complete failure in Perak (as to which I should desire further evidence, looking to the comparative success which would appear to have attended it in Salangore), it would clearly have been right that Her Majesty's Government should have an opportunity of considering whether this arose from any inherent defects in the arrangements, from errors in administration, or from the selection of persons individually unsuitable for duties of special difficulty.
16. In paragraph 21, however, of your despatch, you mention that you suggested to Ismail, as a solution of the difficulties arising from the absence of any real government in Perak, that the government of the country should be directed by British officers; and after describing your interview with Abdullah, you "confess (par. 26) that before com- "municating with the Chiefs, you had inclined to the opinion that the best course to adopt would be to declare Perak British territory, and govern it accordingly: but on "weighing well the impressions conveyed to you by your interviews with the Chiefs, it "did not appear to you expedient at present that this course should be adopted; and you determined, if the Sultan could be induced to agree, to adopt the policy of governing Perak by British officers in his name."
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17. How far, indeed, this middle course of governing by British officers in the name of the Sultan really differed from an assumption of actual sovereignty, and how far, as such, it was likely to recommend itself to him or practically to succeed, I need not now stay to inquire. I will not follow you into the considerations which appear to you to recommend this course, but I cannot refrain from observing that when in support of it you say that we shall thus be able either to recede from this position, or to adopt a more advanced policy, you anticipate a state of affairs which is, unfortunately, very little consistent with the condition of things with which Her Majesty's Government are now coupelled to deal.
18. Nor is it necessary for me to discuss the arrangements which you describe for appointing two "Queen's Commissioners" to govern the country.
19. All these constitute large and important changes, as to which you had no ground for supposing that Her Majesty's Government would approve a very material depar ture from the policy, which had been provisionally sanctioned as an experiment, of tendering advice to the native rulers through British residents.
It would, of course,
have been quite proper, and, indeed, right for you, if strongly convinced of the inefficacy of existing arrangements, and satisfied that you had devised a be ter system, to lay your proposals before me; and you might have relied upon their receiving, if not my concurrence, at all events that full and careful consideration which the importance of the subject, as well as the confidence which I placed in your judgment and ability, and which, under all the previous circumstances, I had ungrudgingly given, must secure for
them.
20. But, instead of taking that easy and obvious course, you at once issued a Procla- mation which altered the whole system of government, and affected in more or less degree a vast number of individual interests, provoking, apparently, the crisis with which we have now to contend.
21. I fail, however, to perceive in your despatch any proof that the change of policy, if desirable, needed to be introduced "instantaneously. If, indeed, you were strongly of opinion that early action was advisable, you could have consulted me by telegraph. As you might in this manner have explained the course which you wished to be permitted to take, I am altogether unable to understand how you came to omit this obvious duty. I can only conclude that, being convinced of the soundness of your own judgment, you acted in lamentable forgetfulness of the fact that you had no authority whatever for what you were doing.
22. In the internal administration of a Colony there are, no doubt, occasions on which
■ Governor, being commissioned in general terms to see to its good government, is called upon to incur the responsibility of acting without specific instructions, although even in such case it is his day, if possible, to avoid acting in opposition to the general policy which has been prescribed to him without express sanction from home. But your powers or responsibilities as the Governor of the Straits Settlements cannot be held to apply to the relations of Her Majesty's Government with the Malay States in the same manner and degree as to the internal affairs of the Colony, and it was #pecially incumbent upon you to be careful not to depart from the policy which had been #pproved.
23. It would have been equally my duty to make these observations if your anticipa- tions as to the effect of your new policy had not been so speedily and so deplorably
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falsified. You state in the 34th paragraph of your despatch, "It may possibly be sug- gested that the Malays might make some forcible resistance to the government of Ferak being undertaken by British officers. I beg to assure your Lordship that I have "made most particular inquiry on this point, and I am convinced that there is not "the least probability of such an event." You add, however, that "we may have "occasionally to deal with a refractory Chief," and that, "with reference to such a
contingency, I have thought it as well to send up a few small pieces of ordnance." 24. Mr. Birch also thought it necessary to telegraph to you that after the posting of the Proclamations all was quiet; and I can form no other conclusion than that there was throughout too much reason to apprehend resistance on the part of some, at all events, of the natives to the new powers conferred upou British officers.
25. I regret, therefore, that, as at present advised, I am quite unable to approve your action with regard to the State of Perak. I repeat that ain now rather asking for your explanations than stating my final decision as to your conduct, and I shall be much relieved if you are able to make such explanations as Her Majesty's Government can accept. In the meantime, with every desire to do justice to your proceedings, I am reluctantly compelled to say that I fail as yet to perceive either that your new policy even if more successfully and cautiously introduced, contained the elements of success, or that there were any circumstances justifying you in acting without that express permission which could have been either given or withheld without more than a few hours' delay.
26. I will not on this occasion recapitulate the telegrams which have passed since the sad intelligence of Mr. Birch's murder was first transmitted by you. The time has not yet arrived, nor have I the necessary materials, for entering into a consideration of the policy which must for the future govern the relations of Her Majesty's Government with the Malay States beyond the Settlements. I have repeatedly informed you that no annexation of territory is permitted. Such a measure, if under any circumstances necessary, should be adopted only on clear evidence of its necessity, of deliberate purpose, and by the express desision of Her Majesty's Government, as responsible to the Crown and Parliament. You have, in a succession of telegrams since the date of Mr. Birch's murder, requested military reinforcements; and Her Majesty's Govern- ment, though disapproving of the course of action which has led to this outbreak, bave placed at your disposal a force of men, of ships, and of artillery, far in excess of any which, on previous occasions, have been found necessary to punish crime or repress disturbances in those States. You have distinctly pressed the necessity of these rein- forcements, principally from the apprehension of some general rising of the Malay population; and in their ignorance of the precise state of affairs at a great distance, and with interrupted telegraphic communication, Her Majesty's Government have accepted your statement; for, whatever inay have been the origin of these disturbances, they entertain no shadow of doubt that the resistance must be overcome by the promptest and most vigorous measures, and Her Majesty's authority must be vindicated. This is, in their eyes, the first and immediate consideration, but it is their next and scarcely less anxious desire that the field of operations should not be enlarged. The objects, as I stated to you in an early telegram, are the punishment of those connected with the death of Mr. Birch and the protection of the lives of British subjects wherever they may be in danger; and from this limited but sufficient view of the action to be taken. Her Majesty's Government, as at present advised, see no reason to depart. But the retention of Her Majesty's forces in a country continuing to possess an independent jurisdiction for the purpose of enforcing measures which the natives do not cheerfully accept, could clearly not be permitted. And if, as I am still disposed to believe, the system of Resident British officers, advising but not directly administering, is found on further consideration to be one which it is desirable to maintain, its leading principle must obviously be that it should not need to be upheld by force against the feelings and wishes of the people, or of any persons who, by whatever right; exercise a great and undoubted authority.
I have, &c.
K 3
(Signed) CARNARVON.
PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE
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882
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Reference
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