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himself from the two books kept by me and Embad. I sign the wages book, and also others who are present. When I am not present, Mr. Poulin makes me sign it when I receive my pay.'
It would therefore appear that the signatures bearing to attest the docket are not entitled to the smallest weight; and yet upon the faith of facts so attested magistrates are often forced to proceed. I am of opinion that some severe penalty should be attached to the least departure from rigid truth, or to any ambiguous statement contained in the books of an estate.
9. With reference to the 9th count, the facts proved, undobtedly show an illegal course of dealing, on the part of the employer, and a wilful breach of contract. The obligation of the employer is to pay wages, and with one or two clearly specified exceptions, no deduction from the amount can be legally made by the master without the authority of the Magistrate. With reference to this particular ground of deduction—uncompleted work-the stipendiary laws afford ample means to a master to punish such an offence; but they do not authorize him to take the law in his own hand, and to decide in his own case what shall be deemed an unfinished task, or what amount of fine shall be inflicted. The Royal Order in Council provides (cap. 4 sect. 7) that on complaint and proof by a master before any Stipendiary Magistrate that a "servant has neglected to perform his stipulated work, or that he has performed it negligently or improperly
the Magistrate may, in his discretion adjudge the servant to
a pecuniary penalty for the benefit of his master, not exceeding one month's wages or to imprisonment, with or without hard labour, for fourteen days. By the Ordinance 31 of 1867, Article 23 it is placed in the option of the master to require a labourer to perform task work, "giving him such tasks as can be reasonably required for him;" and it is provided that any question as to "the reason- ableness of any task" shall be decided by the Stipendiary Magistrate. These provisions clearly show that the law intended to guard against the master's judging in his own case, and that therefore any such arbitrary fine as that inflicted for "sick-work" on this estate by the master himself is quite illegal. Apart from the illegality of the act itself, the amount of the deduction is quite out of proportion to the offence. The evidence showed that, whatever amount of work remained unfinished, the fine inflicted was always the same, and that it was always a sum equal to the day's wages of those of the complainants who were paid at the highest rate.
•
Had there been no other charge proved against the employer than this, I would have been inclined to view it as of so serious a nature as to demand the cancellation of the labourers' contracts. When a master takes the law, in such an important matter as wages, into his own hand, be commits such a breach of the contract, as, in my opinion, should entitle the labourer to have it set aside altogether.
IV. Examination of the Judgments,
I come now, in conclusion, to examine the judgments of the Stipendiary Court, and of the Court of Petty Sessions, as regards their harmony with the facts proved, and with what I apprehend to be the law.
The judgment of the Stipendiary Magistrate does not contain a statement of the grounds, in fact, upon which it proceeds, but is confined to a bare enunciation of the result at which the Magistrate had arrived in his own mind. In the first paragraph, a reason is assigned why "the case was a long and unnecessarily protracted one," namely: because of "the mode of procedure adopted in Stipendiary Courts for collective complaints." In this opinion I cannot concur. I am not aware that the mode of procedure in collective complaints is different in the Stipendiary Courts from that adopted in other Courts. The real reason for the delay attending the decision of the complaint, is to be found in the necessary tardiness of examinations of witnessess speaking a foreign tongue, and in the unnecessary delay occasioned by the manner in which the defendant conducted his case.
1. To come now to the various counts of the complaint―
The Judgment of Mr. Renouf, so far as it relates to the first and most important count, is in the following terms:—
"On this point my judgment is in favour of the defendant."
It is to be regretted that the Magistrate did not put on record the reasons which led him to this conclusion, as it is almost impossible to discover the grounds of his opinion. The ratio of his judgment could not certainly have been an opinion that the evidence showed that the complainants were not worked for more than nine hours per diem: For the evidence of the witnesses most favourable to the defendant, showed
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that, from roll call to the bell for ceasing work in the evening, was a period--exclusive of the time (thirty or forty minutes) allowed for breakfast-of about eleven hours. Further, if any credence is to be given to the statement of the defendant himself, his labourers were worked daily for upwards of eleven hours. Taking then the evidence of the defendant himself, of the employés examined on his behalf, and of the proprietors of the neighbouring estates, there is no possible ground for coming to a conclusion "favourable to the defendant," 'on the facts proved. The law, on the other hand, is so explicit, as to leave no room for doubt on that score. The grounds which led the Magistrate to his conclusion must, therefore, remain a mere matter of conjecture. If a conjecture is to be ventured, I am inclined to think that the ratio of the judgment is to be found in the fact that the planters, examined on oath, stated that their bells were rung about the same time as those on the "Mont Choisy" Estate; and that this evidence of common breach of the law led the Magistrate to disregard the clear terms of the law when opposed to the contrary custom of these three or four neighbouring estates. The judgment of the Petty Sessions on this count, although it marked their disapprobation of the system pursued on the defendant's estate, and punished to some extent however inadequately-the breach of law on the part of the master, was, so far as the complainants were concerned, as barren and unproductive of benefit to them, as that of the Stipendiary Magistrate. The Petty Sessions found that the practice of overworking labourers was proved, but the only penalty inflicted was a fine of 10., to be paid by the master. This is said to be the "maximum penalty." But this clearly arises from the unnatural reading of the clause under which the fine was imposed. That clause is the 10th Article of Ordinance No. 15 of 1852, which provides that " In every case in which a complaint has been proved against a master or servant, under the provisions of the 7th and 8th Sections of the 4th Chapter of the above recited Order in Council (7th September, 1888), and in every case of ill-usage of a servant by bis master, whether by assault or otherwise, the Stipendiary Magistrate may, according to the circumstances, award a fine not exceeding 107., in place of compensation to the complainant, as provided for in the said sections." Now, though a maximum fine of 101. is here mentioned, it is only referred to as the maximum in "every case of ill-usage
of a servant by his master." The language and spirit of the law entitle a Magistrate to inflict a fine of 101. in "every case of ill-usage of a servant" by his master; and the mere fact of the grievances of many servants being included in one complaint does not, of course, affect the power of the Magistrate. The statement that the fine mentioned is the maximum fine which could be inflicted in the circumstances is, therefore, unfounded. Again, regarded as a punishment for the offence proved, it is quite inadequate. How inadequate the amount of the fine was may be easily illustrated. Calculating the value of overwork to the defendant at the rate formerly adopted, namely, on the supposition of the extra work being only one and a-half hour per diem, and not-as the evidence showed it not unfrequently was-three hours, the unpaid wages alone (without taking into account the rations due and retained), would, in one year amount, for the complainants alone, to between 901. and 1001., or nine or ten times the amount of the fine.
The form of punishment which the Court adopted as the most suitable to meet the demands of the case is open to the most serious objections. The object of the com- plainants was to obtain redress for injury suffered to gain compensation for unremu- nerated labour. But the Judgment does not at all afford them the remedy they demand. As already stated, I think no pecuniary compensation would of itself indemnify the complainants. They complained of, and proved, the most serious breach of their contract, and, in fairness, they were entitled to obtain the cancellation of the contract, in addition to the actual compensation due for overwork. The Court (with the exception of Mr. Robertson, who dissented, and whose reasons for dissent are appended hereto, Appendix No. 5) declined to give either the one remedy or the other, and contented itself by avenging the injured law by means of a fine inflicted on the wrongdoer, without providing in any way for redress or compensation to those who were the immediate sufferers from the wrong.
5. Omitting consideration of the judgment pronounced by Mr. Renouf with reference to the second, third, and fourth counts of the original complaint-as to which the evidence was not uniform or consistent--we come to the fifth count of the original complaint, the second in the amended complaint. The allegations with regard to this count the Magistrate found proved, and he therefore ordered the defondant "to pay to each of the complainants the sum of bs., as an indemnity or refund." This judgment was, in my opinion, very inadequate to meet the state of fact found by the Magistrate to have existed on the estate. The Magistrate found that defendant had made a reduc-
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