2
if England should lose for the moment the supremacy in those waters, yet, even in that case, the officer commanding in the Island might reasonably expect to be relieved, after no long interval, if seriously attacked or menaced by a hostile force, and it would, therefore, be his duty to hold out to the last extremity. To enable him to do so, he should have a
place d'armes to which he could retreat.
**
11
When the British took Mauritius in 1810, they landed on the north side of the Island, marched on Port Louis, and the French General capitulated. He was obliged to do so, as the French had no naval force in those seas on which he could calculate for relief of assistance; and he had no citadel or Place Forte in which he could shut himself up, although the French had 300 guns in position round the island, where they lie to this day.
Mr. Cardwell has entered upon these considerations, because he regards the whole question of the garrison of Mauritius as pressing for solution by Her Majesty's Govern. ment, under the circumstances of the present moment.
And
Sir Henry Barkly considers that "even if there were men to work the few heavy guns (at Port Louis), that would alone be of the slightest use, both Fort George and Fort William could be knocked to picces by the first broadside of an iron-clad." Mr. Cardwell cannot propose to Parliament a large outlay for barracks, unless the fortifica- tions are in such a state as to render secure, against sudden attack, the troops who might occupy the barracks. He is not prepared to recommence the task of building fortifications for a force maintained for purely Colonial purposes, when the cost has scarcely ceased of erecting the works so described by Sir Henry Barkly. He does not see his way to recognize the Mauritius as an Imperial station, calling for new fortifications solely at the expense of this country, seeing that its principal importance is derived from the protection which it affords to our trade with India. Meanwhile it is impossible, in the present sanitary state of the island, to send back the portion of the troops now at the Cape, until salubrious quarters shall have been provided for them; and it is very unsatisfactory to leave the smaller portion of the troops in an insalubrious town, or to leave the Colony in the state of insecurity described by Sir Henry Barkly.
The question then seems to press for the decision of Her Majesty's Government how far Mauritius is to be considered as an Imperial station; and how far, in that case, Indian revenues should contribute to any expenditure, which it may be necessary to incur.
Sir F. Sandford,
&c.
&c. &c.
I have, &c.
(Signed)
H. K. STORKS.
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Reference :-
TTTTTIC.O.882
MINUTE by Sir F. ROGERS.
TWO questions seem to arise here--
1. What is to be done?
2. Who is to pay for it?
Taking the first, as Mr. Cardwell now does, from a merely Imperial point of view- and supposing that we have to guard against a rush of troops from Réunion (in which it may be assumed there will always be a much greater force than at Mauritius)-supposing further, that the French have it their own way at sea for a short time-and that the configuration of Mauritius renders it impossible to prevent their landing a superior force in parts of Mauritius-then we should understand whether it is proposed so to fortify Port Louis as to keep that port in our hands till relief comes, even.against a superior force; or whether it is only required that there should be somewhere in the Island some fortified barracks capable of holding the soldiers, and enable them to escape being made prisoners, and to prevent the French from obtaining undisturbed occupation of the Island.
That is one point; the other is, what is the real force necessary under these circumstances?
A very different expenditure of money would, I suppose, be required to defend an unhealthy port and town against military and naval attack, or to defend a fort in some salubrious position against soldiers only.
On these points I of course have nothing to say, but it strikes me as being desirable
to clear out the issues.
As to the incidence of expenditure:-
The first question is between the Colony and the Empire.
Now, in a case of joint advantage it seems fair that each should pay somewhat less
(in consideration of the advantage afforded to the other) than what they would have to
pay if they had simply to do all they wanted for themselves and by themselves.
What the Colony wants is protection against internal disturbances, and against
2
Encl. 4 No. 2.