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of the Soviet Communist Party to control China for long;
but a breach if it comes will only be affected to a slight
extent by the actions of foreign powers, even the United States. No non-Communist power can hope to do much to promote a
"Titoist" development of the Chinese Communist Party
that is,
a break from complete domination by the Kremlin, without necessarily the abandonment of Communist principles in internal economic and political levelopment. (Tito's own breach with
the Kremlin was not prevented by Western policy towards him before the breach.)
4. On the other hand we must exploit, so far as is possible within our very limited means, the points of friction between the Chinese and Soviet Communist Parties, the Chinese People's Republic and the Government of the Soviet Union, and the people of China and the Russian agents of intelligence, security and economic and commercial penetration. It is essential to any
policy of such "encouragement" of Titoism that there should be throughout our propaganda and guidance to the press no
suggestion that such a tendency is, in fact, developing or that
we want it: on the contrary, our propaganda should harp on the domination of the C.C.P. by the Kremlin and the consequent subordination of Chinese interests to those of Russia, both throughout China in general and in the border provinces especially. His Majesty's Government's policy of recognition of the Peking Government makes it necessary that all our emphasis should be on the attempts of Russia to obtain the subservience of China and advantages at Chinese expense; we should not criticise the behaviour of the Chinese Communist Party and Government in acquiescing to the Kremlin's behaviour.
5.
Publicity about Russian policy in China can be richly illus- trated from the precedents of Soviet behaviour in Eastern Europe,
/the.