2
NIT-;
he must maintain his immigration regulations intact and he could not condone the entry of persons without entry permits. He also claimed that it could not be established whether these men were in fact Nationalist soldiers nor confirmed that they did not contain Communist agents. He was partic- ularly ired by what he regarded as the high handed action of the Hong Kong Government in sending this ship up although he had not given the assurance which I had requested, that the soldiers would be admitted, as this placed him in the embarr- assing position of having to yield to force majeure or face the undesirable publicity of sending them back.
5.
I pointed out the inhumanity of refusing to accept and care for these soldiers, many of whom had lost their sight and their limbs in fighting for the Nationalists, and the publicity which would be made of such treatment. He insisted, however, that the security of Formosa must be his first concern and that in any case the island could not bear any additional burden,
6.
As the Governor appeared unmoved by my arguments on humanitarian and publicity grounds I mentioned, as a last resort, the possibility that the Hong Kong Government might curtail entry from Formosa (see Hong Kong telegram No. 7 paragraph 3 to me) if they were not relieved of this burden. As I had expected he replied that he would not be influenced by threats; Formosa was not so dependent on Hong Kong as we might think, in fact such a ban would assist him econom- ically by stemming the flow of capital to Hong Kong, and if the Hong Kong Government persisted in its present attitude towards Formosa, the island's trade would be switched to Japan for which preparations were already being made (see my despatch No. 26 of 17th February on the proposed trade agreement to be sponsored by E.C.A.),
7.
Although the Governor informed me on leaving that all the soldiers would be returned to Hong Kong and that no more would be accepted in future unless they received individual valid entry permits, he subsequently saw General Chen Cheng, the Director General of the South East Political and Military Headquarters, and as a result the departure of the S.S. Kweiyang was delayed and on 22nd February some 500 soldiers were permitted to land. The agent is hopeful that more will be admitted but expects that for matters of face between one and two hundred will be returned.
8.
The inhumane attitude of the Nationalist authorities in this case has been inexcusable but they have attempted to justify themselves on security grounds in their present extremity and they are no doubt motivated by the fear that if they take in these wounded Nationalist soldiers from Hong Kong they may not only be asked to take further batches which may be sent into Hong kong from Communist China, but also the very large numbers who have taken refuge in Indo- China.
It should also be mentioned that the Nationalists are under pressure from America to curtail their military budget and reduce the size of their army in Formosa as a pre-requisite for E.C.A. economic aid. My bargaining position has also been weakened somewhat by the rigid manner in which the Hong Kong Immigration regulations are applied to Fornosa. I have now received a written reply to my request of 23rd
/January