and not waiting for demands or actual conflict. One cannot help feeling doubtful if Coussey would have happened so soon if it had not been for the events of early 1948. Further, I believe that developing in the way suggested above will be more likely to make people want to stay.
17. There are some places which we should not let go even if the people wanted to. Whether wo can stop them must depend ultimately on their size; I doubt if we could stop eithor Wales or Scotland if they wanted to follow Ireland, and I doubt if we could stop Nigeria or the Gold Coast. Wo could certainly stop Gibraltar (in the inconceiveable event of its proferring Andalusia) and we could stop Cyprus, though if the suppression of rebellion had to go on for a very long time it would be difficult in modern conditions of world thought. All this emphasises the necessity of meeting aspirations by a definite move towards that degree of independence which can be achieved within the limits of the inescapable interdependence of today, before clamour results in too much having to be given or being taken.
18. On the contrary side I cannot think it would ever be right to transfer territory to another power without the full consent of the inhabitants. The Treaty of Utrecht provides that Gibraltar should go back to Spain if we do not want it and I suppose in that case we could give the inhabitants the chance of moving they would be owed their own choice of future home. While in West Africa I believe the ultimate future must depend on a partner- ship of French and Britain with African, if the two former are to stay there, I am sure there are no Africans in British territory who want to be French and there are at least a number in French who would prefer to be British. It seems to me a denial of all we stand for to hand over people who want to stay with us. The problem of the New Hebrides might perhaps (subject to the capabilities of the inhabitants, of which I know nothing) be solved by an Anglo French guarantee of its autonomy. Perhaps the case of Muscat is a part analogy. Its independence is guaranteed by France and Britain and it is vaguely by treaty and effectively in practice in a British sphere of influence.
19. When it comes to the question of the relation of colonios with each other and with the United Kingdom the question of common outlook and common interest becomes important. It is possible to have such associations within the commonwealth without common loyalties and common patriotism. Where these are present and geographical considerations permit one should, as in the case of the Caribbean colonics, be able to arrive at a Federal dominion even including the Bahamas or Bermuda, or, as in the case of Gibraltar anything up to incorporation in the United Kingdom. I even feel that despite the distance an offort ought to be made to make it possible for St. Helena and the Falklands to achieve this.
20. Apart from developments on these lines common outlook and common interest plus a sense of value in the British connection not emounting to British loyalty and patriotism are a valid foundation for inter-territory associations, whether on a constitutional or less formal basis. The value of these is incontestable but I wonder whether an assembly of "national" representatives (as opposed to e.g. British Governors) of all the colonial territories could have enough common outlook and common interest (apart from their sense of value of the British connection) to make their joint deliberations of much value? There are of course subjects in which they have a common interest like defence, and there are others in which each of them has an interest like education, but could delegatos from Nigeria, St. Helena, Fiji, the Hadhramaut, Somaliland, Mauritius and Cyprus present any useful joint advice on either of these subjects?
/21.