CONFIDENTIAL
COPY
Hong Kong
1st October, 1949.
X X X X X X X
As you know, I have been in Shanghai since the Communist take-over as correspondent for a British Nowspaper group.
During that time I had opportunities of studying Communist propaganda tactics and did so with much interest having had a background of similar experience myself during the war.
The following are my general conclusions:
COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA IS GOOD AND POWERFUL.
The Chinese Communists have thoroughly mastered the technique of mass propaganda. Their propaganda machine is extremely powerful, and very good indeed. It utilises every form of approach, films, radio, public address systems, the press and all forms of literature, school-books, posters, speakers and teachers, etc. It has apparently limitless resources.
I will not discuss details of methods, save for saying that students and groups of employees are largely used as covert agents, and that many of the appeals are directed towards playing on Chinese national feeling.
ATTITUDE TOWARDS HONGKONG.
In Shanghai, the Communists make no secret of their intention to 'liberate' Hong Kong. Chinese friends in close touch with them tell me that the present policy is not to make any attempt to use military force. Hong Kong, they say, will be left alone in that respect for two or three years, during which time the populace will be given the full effect of propaganda in favour of 'freedom' and 'liberation'. After that, internal troubles will they think make the Colony untenable to the British.
It is my opinion that this assumption on the part of the Communists may be correct. The Kuomintang stirred up a great deal of trouble in Hong Kong shortly after the reoccupation, and Communist resources are much greater. I feel that the whole efforts of the Government of Hong Kong supported by the Home Government will have to be exerted if the danger is to be averted.
SUGGESTED COUNTER. MEASURES.
These, I think, fall into two sections, official and unofficial. Of the first nothing needs to be said save that the Public Relations Cffice should be a key department of the Hong Kong Government.
Obviously though, this department is limited by the fact that it speaks with the weight of authority and commits the Government to its words. Also, much of its material may be viewed by distrust as 'official hand-outs'.
There is room for another organisation, which must have reasonably adequate funds at its disposal, operating outside the Government orbit.