2
4.
H.M.G.'s policy of recognition of the Chinese
People's Republic imposes on us in this propaganda two
limitations: first, that all our emphasis should be on the
attempts of Russia to obtain the subservience of China, and
advantages at Chinese expense, rather than on the behaviour
of the Chinese Communist Party and Government in acquiescing
to the Kremlin's behaviour, and second, that the greater part
of our propaganda should be carried out as far as possible
at one remove from official British agencies of information.
The propaganda concerning Russian policy towards
5.
China can be richly illustrated from the precedents of Soviet
behaviour towards her Eastern European satellites, the
economic advantages which she appears to be seeking and
gaining in Manchuria, her projection of traditional Russian
imperialistpolicy in the Far East as a whole, her tough
commercial methods, her technique of economic exploitation
under ideological cover, and the numbers and personal
behaviour of Russian technicians, advisers, intelligence
agents, commercial negotiators and officials who are
infiltrating into China.
6.
In South-East Asia, the propaganda task is really
divided into two parts: propaganda towards the overseas
Chinese communities on the one hand, and propaganda towards
the indigenous Asian peoples on the other.
7.
The task of propaganda towards overseas Chinese
communities is now severely complicated by the emergence of
Communism as the paramount power in China, the impact of
this development among the overseas Chinese communities,
and the necessity for H.M. G. to attempt to enter into
reasonable relations with the Chinese People's Republic.
As an instance of the difficulty which this development
creates/
Page 60Page 61