which would prejudice the position of Hong Kong as an imperial
trading base, which is the primary justification for the
retention of Hong Kong as a British Colony. On the other
hand if the execution of certain of these measures is
unduly delayed there is a serious risk that either internal
security or the defence of the Colony against a possible
external attack may be prejudiced.
It is therefore a matter of timing on which it is not
possible for valid conclusions to be reached in London.
The whole matter should therefore be kept constantly under
review by the Local Defence Committee.
Having regard however to the fact that the only
justification for the very exceptional measures which have
already been taken, or are still under consideration, for
the reinforcement to the Colony is the existence of a very serious threat to the life of the Colony, either from sabotage within or from attack from without, or both,
The
he only guidance which it is possible for H.M.G. to give
in present circumstances is that, in the event of a
difference of opinion between the military and civil auth-
orities as to the timing of any major security measure,
military view should prevail".
the
It has occurred to us that since what may be involved
here is an issue between the Governor and the Commanders-in-
Chief, it might be useful to have a short meeting with
General Ritchie and Air-Marshal Lloyd before the latter returns to Singapore on (I think) Wednesday.
As regards the question (policy towards Communists in Hong Kong) raised in para. 1 of the memorandum, I see
no reason to change the recommendation made in the last
paragraph
sentence of that menon
I should be glad to have
your views on these matters as soon as possible, and
especially the view of the Ministry of Defence as to the
suggestion as to a meeting with Ritchie and Lloyd.
I am sending a copy of this letter to
to (1) beigadier Price, Ministry of Defence.
to (2) . Dening, Foreign Office.