TOP SECRET
10ctober 1949
3.
JIC(FE)(49)41(Final)
Threat in the Event of a Major War.
(k)
(1)
(m)
(n)
Recommendations
4.
Far East:-
The expulsion of our forces from Hong Kong would be one of the subsidiary aims of the Soviet Union. The task would be allotted, under general Soviet direction, to the Chinese Communists who would be anxious to make use of this chance now that the political deterents referred to in (h) above no longer applied. An immediate attack must be considered inevitable.`
The land threat would be increased by specialised detachments and some armour, which would be all that the Soviet Union would be likely to send south of the Yangtse valley.
The air threat would be little greater at first, but would be increased by the participation of up to 200 Soviet tactical bombers and up to 160 Soviet ground attack fighters, as airfields in Central and South China were stocked up as bases for their use. There would also be occasional sorties from Soviet territory by long-range bombers carrying 20,000 lbs of bombs each. The maritime threat would be increased, from D day onwards, though to no great extent, by Russian submarine activity.
Large scale desertions from the Chinese sections of Hong Kong defence, police and civil defence services may be expected on the outbreak of war between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers.
We recommend that the British Defence Co-ordination Committee,
(1)
(ii)
endorse this report as an expression of their views; approve the despatch of copies to the Governor and Commander British Forces, Hong Kong, the Local Intelligence Organisations Singapore, Hong Kong, Federation of Malaya, Sarawak and North Borneo, the United Kingdom Liaison Mission, Tokyo, H.M. Embassy Office, Conton, the Joint Intelligence Committee, Melbourne and the Joint Intelligence Organisation, Wellington.
(Signed)
TOP SECRET
M.J. CRESWELL.
P. GLEADELL.
J. WHITEHEAD.
R.T. POWER (for M.J. EVANS). K.A. BLACKER.
J.P. MORTON.
W.H.J. RICHARDSON.
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