11 October 1949

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2

JIC(FE)(49)41(Final)

(e)

| (1)

The only type of eir action likely during this phase is reconnaissance. No maritime threat is to be expected.

An economic embargo would probably not be imposed during this phase.

Development of the Threat

(g) At some stage the Communists may be expected to

disclose more clearly their intentions to secure the return of the Colony. Thereafter they would intensify the subversive activities described above, making renewed attempts to undermine the police, and to engin- eer a major outbreak of internal disorder. They may also impose an economic embargo in an attempt to convince His Majesty's Government that the continued retention of Hong Kong purely as a military fortress, would be too heavy a liability.

(h)

(i)

(j)

They will use their military forces deployed on the border to test British reactions and possibly also to assist Soviet strategic aims by tying down U.K. forces in the Far East. In view of the restraining influence likely to be exerted at the present moment by the Soviet Union, and the reluctance of the Chinese Communist Party to challenge the United Nations and thus to prejudice its prospects of international recognition, and to engage in battle with balanced forces trained to Western standards, a military attack will remain unlikely.

Should, nevertheless, the Chinese Communist Party decide that an attack was to be made on Hong Kong, the Chinese Communist Army would be unlikely to attempt it until they had concentrated a force of about 80,000 men, which is unlikely to happen before the end of November, 1949 and might take longer. Moreover, the necessity for regrouping and reorganising this force would probably retard the date of an all out attack until January, 1950, especially if considerable Nationalist opposition were encountered before the capture of Canton.

The land offensive wruld be supported by sporadic air attacks in which the Communists would not be able to use more than a few aircraft with any real co- ordinati n or precision. Though the results achieved on military objectives would not be serious, the effect on the Chinese population would be out of all proportion to the meterial damage inflicted and might increase the requirement of troops for internal security duties. The maritime threat would consist of sabotage of merchant shipping and warships, minelaying in channels adjacent to Communist held territory, and the carriage of raiding troops.

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