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HONG KONG
Report by the Chiefs of Staff
The Defence Committee, at their meeting on
27th April, soussing (54)
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our recommendation on the reinforcements that should now
be sent to Hong Kong, invited us to prepare a fresh
appreciation of the extent of the threat that was likely to develop against Hong Kong.
2.
Our report is attached and is divided into two parts Annex I, the threat to Hong Kong and Annex II, the defence of Hong Kong. A War Office note on the anti- aircraft defence of the Colony is attached as Annex III.
3.
Our conclusions are as follows:
(a) If we show our determination to hold the Colony
there is little likelihood of a direct Communist attack on
Hong Kong
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(10) The garrison, reinforced to the strength shown below, would be strong enough to hold local or guerilla attacks; moreover, its presence would show our determination to hold the Colony and should thus deter the Communists from open hostilities:
Navy: Far Eastern squadron augmented by local patrol craft
to be manned from the cruisers on station.
Army:
Air
Two infantry brigades
One armoured Regiment Squadron (2476)
Two field regiments
One composite A.A. regiment Ancillary administrative units.
One fighter/ground attack squadron of 16 aircraft Force: Fighter control and early warning radar
Five Sunderland flying boats.
(c) In order to bring the garrison of Hong Kong up to
the strength given above, the following military action is
now required (in addition to the despatch of the fighter squadron, the battalion and the brigade headquarters ordered to Hong
Kong last week):-
(1) To send to Hong Kong as early as possible the
(ii)
remainder of the brigade group, namely -
Two infantry battalions
One armoured regiment squadron (2476) One field regiment
One composite A.A. regiment.
To augment the fighter squadron now being sent
to Hong Kong from 8 to 16 Unit equipment aircraft.
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(iii) To bring forward and arm additional local patrol
craft.
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