(c) Ministers felt, however, that they could not ignore the advice they had received that Hong Kong could not be held against attack by a major power operating from the mainland. The Government must be careful to avoid drifting into a position in which, after pouring valuable resources into Hong Kong, they had at the end to withdraw with great material loss and loss of prestige. The aim should be to reinforce the defences of the Colony for the purpose of protecting it against present dangers but to avoid giving explicit long-term commitments which the Government might be unable to fulfil. From this point of view it was important that Ministers should keep under close and continuous review any developments of the situation in Hong Kong and Southern China.
(a) Other Commonwealth countries had been kept in touch with the development of United Kingdom policy in the Far East and would be informed of the decision to reinforce the garrison of Hong Kong. There would, however, be no advantage in attempting at this stage to induce Australia or New Zealand to assist in the defence of Hong Kong. Nor would it be wise to stress in any public statement our consultations with other Common- wealth Governments, since this might be open to the mis- interpretation that we were preparing for serious consequences, The United States Government were being kept generally in touch with developments in Hong Kong but could not be associated with specific decisions relating to troop movements.
(e) In the public statement about the reinforce- ment of the Hong Kong garrison, the balance of advantage was in favour of giving fairly specific information about the nature of the reinforcements which were being despatched. This information would reassure those who might be inclined to underestimate the force which was being sent, and would at the same time indicate that there was no question of sending forces on the scale required for operations against the Communists in China.
(f) The decision that newly-recruited National Service men should not normally be included in drafts sent to the Far East would mean that some of the reinforcements sent to Hong Kong might be slightly below strength.
The Cabinet
(1) Agreed to send to Hong Kong as early as
possible the remainder of the brigade group whose despatch had been approved in principle by the Cabinet on 28th April, 1949.
(2) Agreed to augment the fighter squadron being
sent to Hong Kong from 8 to 16 aircraft, and to collect and arm additional local patrol craft.
(3) Instructed the Chiefs of Staff to report from
time to time on military developments in South-East Asia, with particular reference to the scale of the threat to Hong Kong, and to consider how additional reinforcements could be provided if a large-scale Communist threat to Hong Kong developed.
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