(13096) (1) Wt. 41024-5515 30m 1/47 G.S.St. Gp. 620
PLEASE REFORM TO MR
TOP SECRET CYPHER TELEGRAM
Hayow
WARNING The text of this message must be thoroughly paraphrased if it is to be published or otherwise communicated to persons outside the British or U.S. Government Service. If re-transmitted unparaphrased, the originator must hark it to be sent in " O.T.P." (One-Time Pad).
роз
Fa 44001/28 & fubly
until willed for
7/2015/44.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE
From: G.H.Q. Far East Land Forces
To Ministry of Defence, London
IZ 1466 TOO 191630GH
(191000A)
TOR 20053ɔA
тол
2015
SEACOS 907
19th May, 1949
From FEDSEC
For Chiefs of Staff from Commanders in Chief Committee Far East.
Reference COSSEA 686.8")
1. We estimate that a major Chinese Communist attack on Hong Kong might be on the following scale during the Autumn of this year assuming their forces are on the present basis and that Russian technical assistance is hot widespread. We must stress that our information regarding Communist forces is limited and consequently our assessment of the threat to Hong Kong is largely conjectural.
2.
The Land Threat.
(#3)
Frontal attacks might be made by up to one or two Peoples Liberation Army armies each of about 200,000 See men and each organised into three rifle divisions possibly with two similar armies in reserve. This attack might be supported by a maximum of 400 guns and 100 tanks of sorts. All equipment would be likely to be of United States origin its serviceability and availability of ammunition and spares are likely to be low by our standards. There is no evidence of their ability to maintain sustained attacks on this scale. There would be virtually no MT. In addition diver- sionary raids might be made by sea-borne guerillas and internal unrest and sabotage would be promoted on the largest possible scale.
3.
From the little evidence available the fighting value of best formation of P.L.A. is estimated to be slightly lower than average Soviet rifle divisions of late war.
4.
The Air Threat.
Depending on the extent to which the Chinese Nationalist Air Force defects to the Communists the minimum and maximum numbers of aircraft that will be available to the enemy are estimated as follows
(a) 20 to 30 reconnaissance aircraft.
(b) 20 to 160 ground attack fighters.
(c) 20 to 90 bombers.
TOP SECRET
Page 190Page 191