From: FARELF.
ONE TIE PAD
TOP SECRET
059328
104
94007/28
Read. 20 May, 1949.
D.T.0. 201200GH May.
To:- War Office,
EMERGENCY
TOP SECRET 13151 GI.
For M.I.2
1.
Ref COSSEA 686 of 12 May and SEACOS 907 19 May.
We have been considering nature and scale of major chinese communist
land attack on Hong Kong. Our estimated scale of attack is considerably greater
ervie (in Feb ?)
than that provided by Hong Kong joint services IN EB and is understood to be
greater than your current appreciation.
20
3.
Following is background infm to SP our figures.
In assessing this threat we have not taken into account any time limit.
This attack would not be launched until communists able to mount maximum effort.
40
This cono for frontal attack might be one or two PLA ARMIES each 20000 men fmn three rifle Divs possibly with two similar armies in res. Conc of this
force Canton area is quite feasible̟ · and in any event communists will have
unlimited manpower.
5.
Frontal attack may be SP by miximum 400 guns.
Understand 726 guns were
SIP
OP in/Yangtse crossing.
into as of 36 guns each used on Russian model as Arty fmns.
12 guns were allotted each army remainder being org
6. Attack might be SP by up to 100 Tks.
Understand that communists have
captured 200 American tks from nationalists by Jan 49 and by now they will have considerably more. We assume tks can be moved on Hangkow
7.
Canton rly.
We have little infm regarding servicability of eqpt and availability of amn. We are seeking further infin regarding nationalist sups and communist munitions production. While communist supporting arms are a wasting asset communists would undoubtedly conc their best eqpt and sufficient reserves of am for such attack.
/8. Fighting
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