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1177 231610A TOD 231820A
From :
Ministry of Defence, London.
ΤΟ
G.H.Q. Far East Land Forces.
DEF 574
23rd. May, 1949.
For FEDSEC.
107.
1.
For Secretary J.I.C. from Secretary J.I.C.
Your SEC 272. (103)
Following is our assessment dated 29th. April approved by Chiefs of Staff. In our situation report dated 18th May we stated that we had no more information on the Chinese Communists intentions towards Hong Kong than we had previously and we had no reason to alter previous estimate that there is no immediate threat, but must be borne in mind that Communist armies are now considerably nearer Hong Kong. Date end of August beginning September or thereabouts agreed.
to
2.
Although any strong, Chinese Central Government is likely, in the long run, to desire to acquire Hong Kong, the Communists may well consider that in the early future a stable British regime in the Colony may be use- ful as an economic link with the outside world. Their own internal affairs are also likely to be a major_pre- Occupation for some time. Unless, therefore, Communists are tempted by nationalistic ambitions or possibility of an early conquest to risk hostilities against U.K. it seems unlikely they will attack Hong Kong for some time. Evidence of British intention to defend the Colony would be an additional deterrent and in any case Communists will probably try to obtain its rendition by negotiation before resorting to force.
3.
Internal threat should the Communists decide to attack Hong Kong likely to comprise labour unrest, strikes, demonstrations, and disaffection among Chinese element of Volunteer Forces. Police force may also become unreliable. Communists in Colony may be instructed to create revolut- ionary situation by these means without waiting for armed assistance from armies from the north, and in this connection may be helped by 80,000 Communist irregular forces estimated to be in South China. There would also be large scale refugee problem to contend with.
4.
Land threat would be limited by narrowness and difficulties of the approaches to the Colony's frontier
iffic defences. Without local knowledge of ground we are unable to estimate accurately the size of force that could be employed against the frontier defences but consider it might amount to the equivalent of 2-3 divisions. In addition there would undoubtedly be attempts to land by sea.
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