1.
Views of
Commanders-in-Chief.
ANNEXURE
Colonial Office Views
Our Comments
TOP SECRET
The Threat
By the third quarter of 1949 the following threats may exist:-
(a)
Serious threat to internal
security by Communist inspired strikes, murder, arson, and terrorism, aggravated or caused by large influx of refugees.
(b) Threat of land attack by guerilla
forces in addition to (a) above.
(c) Remote threat of light scale air
attack.
It is imprudent to base any plans on the assumption that the threat is unlikely to develop before the third quarter of 1949.
We agree that threat may develop sooner than third quarter of 1949
(a) No sea borne threat other than
by refugees and possibly small scale guerilla landing parties
Colonial Office doubt the possibility of effectively closing 200 iles of sea frontier and stress the need for considerable Service assistance.
We consider that the threat of light scale air attack is so remote that no additional A.A. need be provided to guard against it.
We consider that the C's-in-C have underestimated the difficulty of preventing illegal entry by sea.
In addition we consider that Communist domination in China would tend to:-
(i) bring the Trade Unions increasingly
under Communist control.
(ii) make the Chinese element of Police
Force and Hong Kong Volunteer Defence Force unreliable
This would enable the Communists to being the whole life of Colony to a stop whenever they wished.
2. Forces to Meet the Threat
(a) Army
(i) Four Infantry Battalions (includes
the Infantry Battalion of H.K.V.D.F.). Note:-
Infantry Battalion of H.K.V.D.F. will not be operational until June, 1949, and one mfantry Battalion will not be up to fully trained strength until October, 1949.
(ii) One Field Regiment.
(iii) One Coast Artillery/Anti Aircraft
Battery (H.K.V.D.F.).
Note:-
Unlikely to be operational before latter half of 1950. (iv) the provision of an air defence
organisation recruited on an auxiliary basis.
(v) One Brigade Group available at short notice to reinforce Hong-Kong in emergency.
Note:-
This cannot be done until present energency in Malaya ceases and even then would depend upon the retention in the theatre of the equivalent of one Brigade held specially to meet the emergency.
(b) R.A.F.
(i) One Fighter Squadron
(ii) One Flying Boat Squadron.
(i) P.R. Element.
(iv) Transport Element (for supply
dropping)
(i) The military and civil forces
available and being formed would be wholly inadequate to meet a serious threat if it should develop within the next six to nine months.
(ii) The H.K.V.D.F. carot remain
mobilised for a prolonged period to meet a cold war situation without disrupting the economic life of the Colony. Such disruption might well suit Communist aims and should be avoided at all costs.
(iii) Owing to the non-availability of
additional forces to reinforce Hong-
Kong either from within the Far East theatre or from outside, the possibility of raising additional battalions of the Malay Regiment in order to free other forces for service in Hong- Kong should be examined.
(i) We agree with both Colonial Office comments about the H.K.V.D.F.
(ii) We consider that although the Colonial
Office may be taking a pessimistic view, we must take urgent steps in Malaya to free a Brigade Group for use as a reinforcement for Hong Kong if the necessity should arise.
(iii) We must accept the fact that our Far
East garrison must retain the present reinforcement of one Brigade Group until more stable conditions in Malaya and Hong Kong are assured.
(iv) The Malay Regiment at present consists
of two battalions with a third battalion forming. It is hoped in due course to raise a further three battalions to make a total of six. While we agree with the Colonial Office suggestion to expand the Malay Regiment, we
consider that the extra battalions to be raised would not be ready to free other forces for service in Hong Kong in time to meet an emergency in the next six to nine months. The problem should however be urgently examined.
R.A.F.
We agree eith the C's-in-C estimate of the R.A. F. requirement. The fighter squadron should suffice to maintain civilian morale if an occasional hostile aircraft was seen.
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