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ANNEX
GEIL RAL STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE SITUATION IN CHINA AS FOR SILADOVED IN THE
FOREIGN OFFICE TRECIATION.
As requested we have cxamined the general
strategic implications in the South East Asia and Pacific areas of the situation in China as foreshadowed in the Political and Economic Appreciation by the Far Eastern (official) Committee. We have considered what military action could be taken to meet any possible strategic threat,
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We have assumed that, as forecast by the Foreign Office, the Chinese Communists will soon spread south of the Yangtze and will ultimately control the whole of China. We agree with the Foreign Office that the Chinese Communist leaders pay at any rate whole-hearted lip service to Moscow. It has been appreciated that a Communist dominated China will be allied with the Soviet Union and that the whole of continental China will be immediately available for reconnaissance and preparation of bases and on the outbreak of war for occupation, by Soviet forces. The success of Chinese Communism is hound, therefore,
to stimulate Communist activities in neighbouring countries and to lead to a marked increase in Russian influence throughout South East Asia. This would threaten our position in the Far East and hence our long term strategy.
Allied Strategy
3.
In Whr The Allies' war strategy in the Far East is likely to be:-
(a)
(b)
(c)
To mount a strategic air offensive from
bases in the Japanese islands.
To defend the main support areas of Australia and New Zealand and the minor support areas of Malaya and the East Indies.
To control the sea communications.
Except for the air offensive, therefore, our strategy in both South East Asia and the Pacific is defensive. We aim to deploy the minimum forces in this area so that our main effort can be concentrated in the main operational theatres.
4.
In Peace. In order to avoid dissipating our forces in the Far East we require stable political and economic conditions in Allied territories in peace so that internal security commitments are reduced to a minimum and can be met mainly be local forces. At the same time we must be prepared to display a sufficient show of forces in support of British trade and other interests.
Mr. Radford
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Ø F.E. (0) (48) 34
25002/2/48
+ J.1.C. (48) 133 (Revise) — 14349/9/49 Seim. laga
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