2.
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1.
CARS OF COM
S-IN-CHIEF,
The Threat.
By the third quarter of 1949 the following threats may exist:-
(a) Serious threat to internal
security by Communist inspired strikes, murder, arson, and terrorism, aggravated or caused by large influx of refugees,
(b) Thr at of land attack by guerilla
forces in addition to (a) above
(c) Remoto threat of light scale air
atback
APPENDIX
COLONIAL OFFICE VIEWS
(a) It is imprudent to base any plans plans on the assumption that the threat is unlikely to develop before the third quarter
OUR COMMENTS
AS
the propense A.A.13ty of the HKDF Show by cntiquare to deal with it. however, this wow Nor be sperative, prosivty winter lave K150,
interim
this.
Anangements shown be mode. The Wae Office as at the moment stamining (a) We agree that a throat may develop sooner than the third quarter of 1949.
(a)
ilo sea borne thrat other than
by refugcos and possibly small scale guerilla lanting parties
(d) Colonial office doubt the possibility of effectively closing 200 miles of sea frontier and stress the need for considerable Service assistance.
(b) We apree.
(c) We consider that the threat of light scale air attack is so remote that
nood ba pratades
dist (wo Ammelunt)
(a) The C's-in-C Far East should be asked to comment on the Colonial Office view.
The J.I.C. cons.
onsider that Communist domination in China would tend to:-
(1) bring the Trade Unions
increasingly under Communist control.
(ii) muke the Chinese element of
Police Force and Hong Kong Volunteer Defence Force unreliable.
The Communists might then be able to bring the whole life of Colony to a stop whenever they wished.
Forces available to meet the threat.
(a) Army
(i) Four Infantry Battalions (includes)
the Infantry Battalion of I.K.D.F).
Notul
Infantry Battalion of H.K.D.F. will not be operational until June, 1949. and one Infantry Battalion will not be up to fully trained strength until October, 1949.
(ii) One Field Regiment,
(iii) One Coast Artillery/Anti-Aircraft
Batt.ry (H.I.D.F.).
Note:
Jnlikely to be operational before latter half of 1950.
(iv) The provision of an air defence
vorganisation recruited on an aux→
iliary basis.
Note:-
This has not yet been raised as 3, part of the H.K.D.7.
Army.
The military and civil forces available and being formed would be wholly inadequate to moot a serious. threat if it should develop within the next six to nine months.
The H..D.F. cannot remain mobilised for a prolonged period to neet a cold war situation without disrupting the economic life of the colony. Such disruption might well suit Communist aims and should be avoided at all costs.
Owing to the non-availability of additional forces to reinforce Hong Kong sithor from within the Far East theatre or from outside, the possibility of raising additional battalions of the Malay Regiment in order to free other forces for service in Hong Kong should be exuained.
Army
We agree with both Colonial Office comments about the H.K.D.F.
We consider that although the Colonial Office may be taking, a pessimistic view, we may be forced to free a Brigade Group from Malaya for use as reinforcement in Hong Kong.
We must accept the fact that our Far Fast garrison must retain the present reinforcement of one Brigade Group until more stable conditions in Malaya and Hong Kong are assured or the Gurkha division and local forces are up to strength.
The Malay Regiment at present consists of two battalions with a third battalion forming. It is hoped in due course to raise a further three battalions to make a total of six. While we agree with the Colonial Office suggestion to expand the Malay Reginent, we consider that the extra battalions to be raised would not be ready to free other forces for service in Hong Kong in time to meet an emergency in the next six to nine months. This point, oud
in mind during the presoft Celemis1 ferges.
is being exam
As a matter of sugeney diy the thou office.
J.I.C. (48) 133.
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