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TOP SECRET
4
(b) The times for our own troops moving in MT from present
locations, assuming troops to be at half hour notice,
are:-
(1) From MURRAY BARRACKS to:-
KO LOON
45 mins
SHAM SHUI PO
60 mins
MS 51 (5407)
80 mins
MS 44 (5815) TSUN FAN WAI
TẠI LẠI CAMP
(ii) From WHITFIELD BARRACKS to:-
115 mins
110 mins
160 mins
MS 51
MS 44
TSUN WAN WAI
THI LAM CAMP
(111) From SAN WAI CAMP to:-
CHICK's BRIDGE SHEUNG SHUI FANLING
(vi) From TAI LAM CAMP to:-
YUEN LONG FANLING
50 mins
85 mins
80 mins
130 mins
50 mins
40 mins
35 mins
70 mins 120 mins
(c) We have only one infantry battalion North of the line
ΤΑΙΡΟ WAN KA WAI (3412) and that is at SAN WAI. Next /is infantry battalion/in WHITFIELD BARRACKS. To move this
battalion up to the battle area by road it would have to go forward in MI, The area of NO LOCN CITY may be difficult to get through, owing to civil disorder.
27. Deductions.
(a) The whole time and space situation illustrates clearly
that the peacetime locations of our troops are unsatis- factory for meeting a quickly executed invasion. The units, except for the SAN AI battalion, are located in tactically unsuitable places, i.e.:-
T
(1) The ISLAND battalion would have to pass through both
HONG KONG and KO LOON and cross the water gap. Both the towns might be in a troublous state either involving delays or misappropriation of troops.
(ii) The SAN WAI battalion has a Company detached at
CLEAR WATER BAY which would have to pass through KOLOON.
(iii) The WHITFIELD BARRACKS battalion will have two
companies at LYEMUN.
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(iv) The Field Regiment is in KOWLOON with a battery at
TẠI LAM The layout of this Regiment is not only tactically unsound, but encourages misuse of Field Artillery, which, with limited troops available, is always tempting.
(b) It is therefore essential that, dependent on IS duties
and information, battalions and the Ficli egiment must concentrate early.
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./INTERNAL