6. It was generally agreed that no change should be made to present plans. The risk that the ships might be bottled up in the river by artillery at the mouth of the Whangpoo would have to be accepted. Nevertheless it was thought that the chances that the Communists might object to the presence of H.M. ships at Shanghai might be greatly lessened by an immediate public statement (see Appendix) to the effect that they were there solely as a refuge for British nationals and that they would be withdrawn when the need for their presence had passed.
It was in any case likely that the Communists would demand the withdrawal of all warships from Shanghai as soon as they had taken control.
HONG KONG
7. When the Communists take over Shanghai their attitude towards foreign nationals is likely to show whether or not recent incidents will have made them alter their policy towards foreigners and be a clue to future policy in Hong Kong.
8. Plans exist for the re-inforcement of Hong Kong against the threefold threat of internal unrest, large scale influx of refugees and external aggression by guerilla bands Tc meet a 1 these three threats simultaneously would mean re-inforcing Hong Kong by a brigado group.
9.
The Commanders-in-Chier evidently still think it unlikely that these threats will develop within two months for they have not yet asked for re-inforcements. Nevertheless we cannot discard the possibility that the Communists might absorb Southern China more quickly than has been expected.
10. We must also consider the possibility of a full scale attack on Hong Kong by the Communists.
T
11. It has always been accepted that Hong Kong could not be dofended against a major power in occupation of the Chinese mainland. Nevertheless the Chiefs of Staff were firmly of the opinion that, at least until we see how Communism in China develops, we should plan to hold Hong Kong and to let this intention be known.
12.
13.
They advise the ro-inforcement of Hong Kong by:
(a) A brigade group from the U.K.
(2 months to implement)
A cruiser from Wost Indies (35 days on passage) One of the two fighter squadrons from Singapore (Further consideration would have to be given to replacing this fighter squadron in Malaya)
These moves will also have the advantage of stimulating the efforts of the local government in Hong Kong to prepare itself to meet the threat to internal security until now local defence measures have hung fire because of the feeling that Hong Kong would not be defended.
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