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SITUATION IN CHINA
TOP SECRET)
(Previous Reference COS (49) 58th Meeting, Minute 6) NT453
THE COMMITTEE had a full discussion on the situation in China. After LORD FRASER had recounted the details of the Amethyst incident, the Committee considered whether the results of this incident were likely to affect the present plans for Shanghai and Hong Kong. In the course of the discussion, the Commander in Chief, Far Eastern Station, was called into consultation and subsequently the Minister of Defence entered the meeting. A full record of the views of the Committee on the situation in Shanghai and Hong Kong is contained in the Aide Memoire at Annex to these minutes.
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In the course of the discussion about the possibility of a full scale attack by the Chinese Communists against Hong Kong, SIR PATRICK BRIND expressed the opinion that Communism in China would prove to be a very different thing from Communism in Eastern Europe. It might bring all sorts of evil in its train, but it was not likely to lead to unanimity of outlook among the Chinese. In China, the village was the unit, and it did not make much difference to any particular village what type of Government was in control. He had already heard that the Communists were at sixes and sevens amongst themselves.
THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE said he feared that this view might prove over-optimistic. The Communists were receiving open help from Russia and their leaders were Moscow trained. Furthermore experience showed that as they progressed in China they were imposing Russian police methods on the country.
Shangner
The
SIR WILLIAM SLIM said that the opinion that Hong Kong could not be defended against a major power in occupation of the Chinese mainland would apply if the Chinese Communists became an effective force on the mainland and attacked Hong Kong. Brigade Group which it was proposed to send to reinforce Hong Kong could do no more than provide for internal unrest, refugees, and guerilla attacks. Nevertheless he thought we ought to make plans to hold on against anything less than a full Įscale attack and to demonstrate our intention to do so.
There was general agreement with this view.
THE COMMITTEE :
(1)
Shanghai
Agreed to recommend that the risk should be accepted that the Chinese might bottle up the warships now standing by at Hong Kon for emergency evacuation of British Nationals, provided that a very early intimation was given that these ships are at Shanghai solely as a refuge for British Nationals and that they would be withdrawn when the need for their presence had passed.
(2) Agreed to recommend that the policy for Hong
Kong should be as at 'X' above.
(3)
Instructed the Secretary to prepare an Aide Memoire incorporating their views for the use of the Minister of Defence and the First Sea Lord at their meeting with the Foreign Secretary at 2.30 p.m. that afternoon.
+ Annex
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