SECRET
C.M.(49) 30th
onclusions
Mr. Hufford Suckt.
for defect file.
p.
bopy m 54454/49
CABINET 30 (49)
Extract of CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the Cabinet
held at 10, Downing Street, S.W.1, on
THURSDAY, 28TH APRIL, 1949,
at 10.0 a.m.
55
CHINA
Despatch of Reinforcements to Hong Kong.
(Previous Reference: C.M. (49) 28th Conclusions)
A.
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR informed the Cabinet that at their meeting on the previous day (D.0.(49) 12th Meeting) the Defence Committee had considered whether the garrison at Hong Kong should be re-inforced. They had decided, subject to the approval of the Cabinet, that one infantry battalion and brigade headquarters should be sent to Hong Fong at once and that the remainder of the brigade group should be sent as soon as practicable thereafter. In addition, certain naval and air re-inforcements would also be sent. The Chiefs of Staff considered that, so far as could be foreseen at present, the immediate danger to the security of the Colony was likely to arise from internal unrest, from a large-scale influx of refugees and from external aggression by guerilla bands; and they considered that the re-inforcements proposed would suffice to enable the garrison to deal with these threats. The Defence Committee had expressed the hope that it would not be necessary to send young and untrained National Servicemen to Hong Kong and the War Office would keep this consideration in mind in determining the composition of the brigade group. The despatch of re-inforcements to Hong Kong would reduce the strength of the strategic reserve in the United in dom to one infantry brigade.
In discussion, the following points were
made:
(a) Was it not likely that reinforcements on the scale proposed would be inadequate against a serious attack? And, in that event, were we not endangering these men to no purpose? Again t this, it was pointed out that it was not suggested that the proposed reinforcements would be sufficient to enable the garrison to resist a major attack. The Chiefs of Staff considered, however, that they would be adequate to meet any threat that could at present be foreseen.
In the light of past experience there was no reason to think that the Communist forces would