+
tempted by nationalistic ambitions, or alternatively by the possi- bilty of an early conquest, to risk hostilities against the United Kingdom, it seems unlikely that they will undertake an attack upon Hong Kong for some time. Evidence of the British intention to resist any attack on Hong Kong would considerably reduce the likelihood of the Communists,deciding to attack the Colony. In any case, they will probably at least make an attempt to obtain its surrender by negotia- tion before resorting to force.
6.
Since, however, the possibility of an carly attack on Hong Kong cannot be ruled out entirely, we have estimated below its possible scale and nature.
POSSIBLE SCALD AND NATURE OF ATTACK
Internal Threat
7.
The threat of internal unrest in Hong Kong always exists and could be implemented by the Communists in co-ordination with an armed attack from outside. The Hong Kong Trade Unions are likely under these circumstances to take orders from the Communist authorities in China; the police force may become unreliable; and the Chinese element in the Volunteer Forces may be disaffected. Should, therefore, the Communists decide to attack the Colony, labour unrest, strikes, demonstrations and mutiny are to be expected. It appears possible that the Communists in Hong Kong may not wait for the armed assis- tance of the Chinese Communist Army from the North, but may be in- structed to cause a revolutionary situation in the Colony by the means mentioned above and this may well be assisted by the 80,000 Communists irregulars in the area.
8.
Should it be possible for the Communists to make any sea or air attacks on the Colony, their effect on the morale of the Hong Kong Chinese might be temporarily, at any rate, very serious. Such attacks would further greatly encourage internal strikes by Communist controlled Unions.
9.
As a result of the Communist advance to the South the garrison of the Colony would have to contend with the internal security prob- lem created by an attempted large scale influx of refugees.
Land Threat
10. Although the Communists will have available a land force of the size described in paragraph 4 above, they would not be able to deploy all these forces against Hong Kong. The landward threat would be limited by the narrowness and difficulties of the approaches to the frontier defences. We are unable to assess_accurately the size of force that could be employed without local knowledge of the ground,sut we consider that it might amount to the equivalent of 2-3 divisions. In addition, there would undoubtedly be an attempt to land forces i various parts of the Colony by sea. Large numbers of sampans will be available in the Canton River and Mirs Bay and may well be employel in trying to land troops on the Island of Hong Kong and behind the de- fence line in the New Territories. Recent evidence shows that the Communist Army have managed successfully to collect and man large numbers of local craft for river crossings elsewhere.
11.
The present Chinese Communist Armies bear no resemblance to any previous Chinese Army. Their morale and discipline is of the highest order and the standard of training of the individual soldier is reported to be equal to that of the Japanese. The Communist commanders have also shown that they
-2-