ANNEX II
THE DEFENCE OF HONG KONG
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In paragraph 5 of Annex I we have stated that for political and economic reasons the Communists may very well decide not to attack Hong Kong in the early future even should they quickly overrun the South of China; and that for
military reasons they are unlikely to attack the Colóny if it is clear to them that it will be strongly defended. There is, nevertheless, a possibility of an organised attack being made on Hong Kong by the Chinese Communist Army if we do not show our determination to defend it.
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In March, 1946 it was decided that Hong Kong would not be defended in war against a major power in occupation of the Chinese mainland. We consider that the effectiveness of the Chinese Communist Government is not such that, even if the Communists control the whole of China, it could be classed as a major power. We therefore consider that Hong Kong could be held, unless we are engaged in a war with Russia.
3. Hong Kong, like Berlin, may well become the stage for a trial of strength between Communism and the Western Powers. If the Chinese Communist Government were able to force our withdrawal from the Colony, the blow to our prestige throughout the world would be irreparable and there would be serious repercussions on the efforts now being made against Communism in the Far East.
4. Our aim should therefore be to hold Hong Kong against Chinese Communist aggression even if Communist China declares war on Great Britain.
The Defence of Hong Kong
5.
We examine below the method of defending Hong Kong and the forces required.
6. The defence must be able to deal with the following threats simultaneously:-
7.
•
(a)
internal unrest, probably sponsored by Communist
inspired trade unions;
(b) a large scale influx of refugees in numbers beyond
the capacity of the Colony to absorb;
(c) external aggression.
The Communists would have large numbers of troops available for an attack against the Colony, and could provide considerable artillery support. Such an attack would, however, have the following limitations:-
(a) air support would, in the foreseeable future,
still be lacking;
DO(46) 7th Meeting NT 453
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