66 Lo StongKong
Jel 437TS
6% to Hong Kong
Yel 385 TS
30/4/49. 30/4/49.
(on 54145/49, copy alt)
65. JF (47) 44 [Fond)
Mr. Sidebotham:
I understand from Mr. Webber that the Cabinet are to take C.P.(49)100 enclosed loose within tomorrow morning and that Lord Listowel will attend.
Mr. Webber would like to have a brief this afternoon if possible.
The Chiefs of Staff report is of course the paper we have seen before on various occasions notably at (57) and (68), and you have attended both the drafting process and the consideration. before the Chiefs of Staff. The final form as attached to the Cabinet paper is a little different in layout, but so far as I can see, there is no material change from the earlier drafts.
From the point of view of a brief for
Lord Listowel there is very little to be said from the Defence Department side except that the paper is admirable and should be given the strongest possible support.
The clarification of the exact circumstances in which H. M. G. would defend Hong Kong in the opening paragraphs of Annex II 4 of special interest. Hitherto, the underlying policy has been that we should not attempt to defend the Colony against "a major power in occupation of the Chinese mainland" The Governor of Hong Kong has himself asked what exactly this means, and whether the "major power in occupation of the Chinese mainland" is in practice to be confined to Soviet Russia. The thesis has now been
accepted by the Chiefs of Staff that "...Hong Kong could be held unless we are engaged in a war with Russia", and that "our aim should therefore be to hold Hong Kong against Chinese Communist aggression even if Communist China declares war against Great Britain." From the Hong Kong point of view, this is admirablė. It may however involve a programme of reinforcement with repercussions both on the U.K. home front and in the sphere of shipping see the last sub-paragraph of para.16 - which may require considerable discussion at Minis- terial level.
You will be wishing to think without delay what needs to be said from the political side. If you think it will help as an addendum to the brief, I will prepare a tabular statement of the forces now available in Hong Kong and the reinforcements it is proposed to send there.
B
4.5.1949