--2--
Likely Communist actions
nd policies,
(c) British river steamers
may be stopped from going to Canton (pri- ncipally B. & S) on the grounds that Can- ton is an inland river
port. It may be formally declared so for the pur- pose. At the same time Communists may still wish to send Chinese flag ships; to the Colony.
(d) Shipping under Chinese Communist control will probably be fairly lax under Merchant Ship- ping and Safety of Life at Sea Regulations.
(e) The Communists may impose onerous restrictions and delays on British ships entering Chinese ports. They may insist on the national flag not being flown, and they may in-
troduce rigorous and unnecessary searches.
(f) The crews of Chinese
Communist ships may be troublesome, since the Chinese Seamen's Union has gone left. Trouble may take the form of strikes and arrogant behaviour. This trouble will also extend to Chinese crews on British ves- sels, among whom Communist agitation may be expected.
certainly be considered, Such steps need not be con- fined to Hong Kong.
The Communists must not be allowed to have it both ways.
It is in principle desirable to retaliate by stopping Chinese river steamers coming to Hong Kong. This step must be carefully considered since stoppage of Canton shipping might endanger Colony's food and firewood supplies, though it would also hurt industrial and other supplies through Hong Kong. the Communists who will need very much in the case of Stoppage of Chinese steamers may also be necessary to prevent immigration of large numbers of Chinese wish- ing to escape from Communist rule. This whole quest- ion is not likely to give rise to trouble until the Communists are ready for trouble of a general nature with Hong Kong.
It is unlikely that shipping under Chinese Communist control will be more lax in safety matters than it was under Nationalist control. The record of Comm--- unists in such matters is good. Nevertheless, British and International Merchant Shipping Regulations should in principle be enforced against vessels under Comm- unist control entering Hong Kong, and the ability to apply these rules strictly may be a valuable weapon in exercising pressure on the Communists in shipping matters. At present no certificate issued to ships by the Chinese Communist Government would have in- ternational validity.
Ignorance of international procedure led to early troubles over foreign ships flying their nat- ional flags in Communist ports. This is not now likely to recur. Seadches and other formalities are likely to be rigorous, but experience so far does not suggest that this will be materially worse than under Nationalist China; Customs and other officials are already much less corrupt. Again discrimination is a justification for retaliatory action, rather than rig- orous or inefficient procedure, but in principle all steps which might lead to general reciprocity would be welcome.
Such trouble should be treated delicately but firmly. Insubordination aboard ships should be treated strictly according to Port Regulations. Mis- behaviour ashore should be treated as a Police matter, and as far as possible no opportunity should be given for defendants to bring in politics. The right of the crew to go ashore will have to be considered in the light of treatment accorded to crews of British ships in Chinese ports. It may be necessary to impose strict conditions, which will be difficult to fulfil. Much will depend whether immigration control for Chinese is in force in Hong Kong. Under present conditions of virtually free entry for Chinese into the Colony, ac- tion against Chinese seamen.will be difficult.
Sabotage by Chinese crews of foreign ships is to be expected in due course, but probably not at present. In the case of British ships powers under the Merchant Shipping Act should be adequate, but this may need review. Some owners may consider transferring to Malay or Indian crews, But that is not for Government action, unless security information justified a private warning to owners of non-locally based ships using Hong Kong crews.