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IN..RD SAVING TELEGR.E
En Clair
by confidential bag.
POLITICAL DISTRIBUTION,
FROM SING. PORT TO FOREIGN OFFICE.
(From Coumissioner General in South East „sia)
Mr. MacDonald.
No. 190 Saving.
1st December, 1948.
CONFIDENTIAL.
R. 6th December, 1948.
Addressed to Batavia telegram No. 53 Saving of 1st December repeated to Foreign Office, Rangoon, Bangkok, Saigon, Governor Singapore, and High Commissioner Malaya all Saving,
Your telegrem No. 599 of November 4th] and Scrivener's letter of November 25th to you (not copied elsewhere).
Military action by the Dutch against the Indonesian Republic would produce a sharp reaction of opinion in favour of the Republic among native populations in South East Asia. The strength of this reaction and consequently the degree of direct activity in favour of the Republican cause would vary considerably. In Burma the reaction would be violent and might cause the Burmese to bring the Indonesian situation before the United Nations and to accord full recognition to the Republican Govern- ment: they would hardly be in a position, however, to assist the Republicans with mer arms, or money. In Siam, although there would be press criticism of the Dutch action, the Govern- ment would remain relatively unconcerned, as would the inarticulate mass of the people. In French Indo-China the local moderate Nationalists (ie, General Zuan and his supporters) would be critical, but probably not to the point of breaking off with the French, who would sympathise with the Dutch.
2. Communist parties throughout South Dast Asia, from the Viet Linh in French Indo-China to the Malayan Communist Party in its jungle hide-outs, would exploit the situation in their propaganda.
3. All "Imperialists" would be attacked, including the British. Such attack would not by any means be confined to the extremist vernacular press or come from Communist quarters only. Moderate opinion would be highly critical.
4. The most dangerous result of military action would be to produce a rapprochement throughout the South East Asia between the Communists and the more moderate Nationalists and also those non-Communist left-wing groups from whom the Communists have recently alienated themselves by teking up arms in Malaya and Java. The longer military action had to be continued in Indonesia, the more serious the effects would be both in strengthening Communism directly and in turning despairing
moderate opinion towards Communism. In the Federation of malaya,
for instance, militery action by the Dutch would cause a wave of sympathy for Indonesia among the Malay population. They would question the sincerity of British promises; demands for Immediate self-government of Malaya would bé stimulated, as would support for the idea of Greater Indonesia. Immediate and direct reaction against the British administration would not be serious in the short term because the Communists, who have lost the
/support of