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identity of the enemy. It is assumed in defence plans that the enemy will be Russia and in this connection events in China must be carefully observed. If the Communists make no further imuads it is considered that local security can be maintained by strengthening the police force
as occasion demands, but, in the event of the position in China further deteriorating and resulting in a Communist coup d'etat or a coalition government with strong communist sympathies, then an extremely dangerous situation might arise in the event of war.
13.
Command (E). From the point of view of absolute military efficiency there is no doubt that the supreme command should be exer- cised by a military co.mander over the whole area rather than through civil governments, but it is recognized that, for political reasons, this may not be possible. In that event the prosecution of the war would more expeditiously be pursued through a War Council under the
It is agreed that the War chairmanship of the Commissioner General. Council should have final powers over the individual civil govermors.
14.
Commandos (F). The formation of mon-regular units is at present under consideration.
15.
Labour (G). It has been laid down that the role of North Borneo in war will be to develop, as far as possible, its economic potential and to make available the maximum quantities of raw materials for the Commonwealth war effort. As at present there is a grave shortage of labour and increased emphasis must be placed on the production of food as well as on raw materials, only a very limited amount of labour could be spared in time of war to support regular forces.
16.
Economic Warfare (H) The economy of North Borneo is com- paratively simple and is based primarily on the production of raw materials. There shoulâ be no difficulty in directing production nor would any
On the intelligence sids additional staff be required for this purpose. of ecommic warfare there would be advantage in the establishment of a regional office of the Ministry of Economic Warfare at Singapore or clse-- where in the Far East, but, as manpower 1 North Borneo is strictly limited, it is doubtful whether any contribution to the staff could be made from this territory. As trade contacts are almost exclusively with Singapore and Hong Kong little information could be gathered locally which would not be more readily available in Singapore or họng Kọng.
17.
Finance(I). Certain financial difficulties have arisen with regard to the payment of pre-war Korth Borneo Volunteers, which has caused a certain amount of bad feeling amongst ex-volunteers, and militates It is hoped that this question against the revival of such a force.
will be satisfactorily arranged in the near future but it is considered that it would assist in the recruitment of volunteers and local forces if a policy statement could be zade regarding pay and conditions in the event of internment.
There has been some delay in releasing land and property taken over by the military forces, but this has been largely unavoidable the diamantlement of military installations has necessarily taken considerable time.
18.
All costs relative to the establishment of the pre-war North
The Bormo Volunteer Force were a charge on the local government. question of the incidence of the cost of any local forces which might be raised in future is under discussion, but as the Colony's commitments in
/this regard
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