-3-
Extraction
6./5°
to remain might be given in the case of those with special training such as murses, etc. It is not expected that any difficulty would ***arise in this Colony by the unauthorized return of persons who had been
evacuated as strict control of immigration can be exercised under the Defence Regulations.
9.
Scorched Earth Policy. (C1). On the eve of the invasion by the Japanese a vigorous scorched earth policy was carried out in North Borneo, anŭ there is no doubt that, while it may have been a hindrance to the enemy, the destruction caused has constituted a very large pro- blem to the civil government in the post war period. Denial measures should in future similar circumstances be limited to the destruction of facilities and goods the capture of which would immediately assist the enery in the prosecution of the war, and should be weighed very care- fully against the real military value accruing therefrom. In this territory it would be possible to destroy stocks of petrol, rubber, and other raw materials together with the machinery for their production. » Such facilities as wireless and cable equipment and dock-yard repair machinery should be put out of action. Mobile equipment such as motor transport and ships should not be destroyed but should be withdrawn to safer bases according to the development of the campaign. It is preferable that total destruction should not take place but, where possible, equipment should be imobilized or rendered useless by the removal of essential parts. The timing of denial measures is most important and a scorched earth policy should not be put into operation while there exists a reasonable chance of the survival or recapture of the equipment in ensuing operations. It is considered that railways, bridges and roaïs should only be destroyed in support of military operations. In short, therefore, Denial Measures must be very carefully
weighed in the light of the military situation.
10.
It is not irrelevant here to discuss the damage caused by liberating forces. It was not uncommon for the Allied forces, particular -ly the airara, to regard enemy occupied territory as hostile and to shell and bomb any target indiscriminately. In this manner large-scale
destruction occurred in North Borneo at a time when the surrender of the Japanese was imminent. Such military advantage as was obtained by these attacks was far outweighed by the disruption of the economic life of the country in the post-war period, and by the antagonism of the local population whose livelihood was imperilled.
11.
(C.2 & 3). An assessment should be made in peacetime of the value of all stores, property, and facilities earmarked for destruction in the event of war and compensation should be paid at the earliest possible moment after liberation. The delay in meeting war claims after the recent war has undoubtedly profoundly disappointed those who, in accordance with instructions, carried out denial measures. It may be assumed that property which it is considered necessary to deny the enemy in war must be equally essential, if not more so, in the post-war period. Therefore the replacement of such material should be a first priority. With regard to other claims arising out of the war it is considered that, if it is strategically necessary for a country to be sacrificed to the enemy,
then it should be the commitment of H.M. Goverment or the Common- wealth as a whole to make restoration in full. In a country such as this it is not practicable for a war insurance scheme to be introduced.
12.
Anti British Activities. (D1). The organization of special units to combat fifth column activities must depend very largely on the
/identity of the