TOP
Ref. Def. 017/48.
sir,
THE COLONY OF NORTH FORNEO
Secretariat,
Jesselton.
6th. December, 1948.
39
I have the honour to refer to your Top Searet letter No. 23/30/11/48 dated 20th. October in which you request that urgent consider- ation be given to the study of the despatches which have been published in regard to operations in the Far East during the recent war. The views expressed below result from the deliberations of the Local Defence Committee and have not yet been studied by His Excellency the Governor. Any amend- ments which His Excellency may make will be communicated to you at a later date. It is convenient to deal seriatim with the questions of principle mentioned in Paragraph 5 of your letter dated 28th. May.
2.
Civil Morale (B1). The loyalty of the population generally of North Borneo during the recent war was undo btedly, in large measure, die to the undisturbed conditions and happy relations of the last 50 years under British rule. Gollaboration with the enemy was rotably minor in character and restricted to a few persons whose record was doubtful before the waLT. The native population can scarcely be expected to have such a wide concept of loyalty as obtains throughout the rest of the Commonwealth because their knowledge of world politics is small and their outlook restricted. The Chinese on the other hand may not have been influenced so much by loyalty as by Anti-Japanese feelings and a reasonable urge to protect or regain their own property, which they knew in the past to have been safe under the British flag. While the loyalty of the Chinese therefore may largely have been based on material grounds, that of the indigenous inhabitants was directed towards individuals such as the District Officer whom he had knownL and trusted. The natives proved their worth during clandestine operations prior to liberation, under the command of their former civil officers and not a few Chinese were similarly engageû.
3.
At the beginning of the war the Japanese exercised a considerable influence over the population, who are prone to admire strength and the ideas of co-prosperity spread by the Japanese found considerable support. When, however, the Japanese withdrew their first class troops and replaced them by men of lesser calibre, then their prestige declined and disappeared completely prior to liberation. The prestige of the British, on the other hand, while it may have been low at the beginning of the war, did not suffer the same set back as elsewhere for the reason that the local population did not witness the defeat of the British forces but did, however, observe the eventual defeat of the Japanese by the well-equipped 9th. Australian division. How far the events of the war have undermined confidence of the population it is difficult to assess, but it is probably too much to expect the local inhabitants to make a whole-hearted stand against the enemy in the event of another war, unless they are strongly supported by commonwealth forces. It is not easy for an untutored native to understand the strategy which neœess- itates the withdrawal of armed forces and leaves him to face a period of subjection which would, undoubtedly, be rendered the more severe for him by his active participation against the enemy.
/It must be
The Deputy Commissioner General for Colonial Affairs,
Commissioner General's Office,
Cathay Building,
SINGAPORE.