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pure dyed-in-the-wool, Krend- trained, toeing-the-line Communist hard core [Laughter.] Hon. Gentlemen oppo- site may laugh but they have not the same personal experience as I have in that area. Throughout the war it was my duty to be in touch with those areas, and I have maintained that contact since. I hope the House will give more weight to that evidence than the prefabricated nonsense they may get from some of their back benchers.
Foreign Affairs HOUSE OF COMMONS
[MR. FLETCHER.]
the will not be an iron curtain but a paper one, painted to look like iron with a few terrifying guns and planes on it. What- ever one may think of Communism in the Far East-and I shall come to that a little bit later-is the policy of His Majesty's Government to be non- intervention-to do nothing? I will admit that there is a difference-- [Interruption.] After the accusations which the hon. Member for West Fife (Mr. Gallacher) made against me the other day, I do not propose to take the slightest notice of anything he may say.
Mr. Gallacher: The hon. Gentleman has just taken notice.
Mr. Fletcher: May I continue with what I was saying? There is a difference between Malaya and China. In Malaya the responsibility is directly ours and on that the Government fell down, because they would not permit a Debate to take place for over a year, nor would they listen to any word of warning. In China it is a world responsibility and probably that of the United States of America and ourselves more than anybody else.
What do we see at the present moment? Whatever we may think of the Nanking régime today, agree that it has on many occasions in the past under very difficult circumstances done the utmost that it could, but the facts today -we must not look too much into the past-are that it has to a considerable extent lost the confidence of those who are under its rule. These things happen. One of these days, within a short time, His Majesty's Government may realise what it is to have lost the confidence of the people of this country. It is not an entirely unusual thing. This is a régime which has not changed for about 20 years. Why are so many of its adherents going over, as they undoub- tedly are, to the Communist régime in the North?
Largely because they are offered no alternative whatever. It is not necessarily the case that they are Communist in outlook or likely to be Communist in outlook, but that they feel dissatisfied as they are and have no alternative.
It is right to try to analyse to some extent what the Northern Communist movement is. Undoubtedly at the centre of it and controlling the machine there is
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As I analyse the Communist movement in the North, there is this hard core of trained people, searching out key positions, who intend, if it is possible, to get control of the whole of China for reasons which were given by my hon. Friend the Member for Lancaster (Mr. F. Maclean), who spoke so admirably and clearly on the subject; but that does not necessarily mean that the whole mass of people in North China are Com- munists. There is some danger of falling into that trap and thinking that because has to some extent come under the new the armies have advanced and the country
régime, the people are Communists. They are not. A great many of them are not the slightest bit interested in politics and very little in government. They think of government as something which is loathly in every way and want to get rid of it. China is a very sensible place. In its hierarchy, the merchant takes precedence over the soldier with the politician almost invisible at the far end of the queue. They have some idea of a sense of proportion in these things.
Surely, our job in China, with America, is to offer a possible alternative to those who are at present dissatisfied with one régime and are going to another régime simply because it is not the last
one.
The best way is to make it per- fectly clear to the Kuomintang or an alternative government in Southern and Central China and the mass of the people that we will not be non-interventionists but will intervene in every way we can to support any régime if that régime has the backing of the people of China. The same thing applies in the North. If there is-and it can happen-a change of feel- ing when all the true horrors of Com- munist domination, such as we have seen
in Europe, are put upon China, when the iron heel of the Kremlin comes down
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on North China, and if there is a revolu- tion there, or even a drift away, let us hope that we shall be able to find means by propaganda and other methods to rally those people to the new régime or ourselves.
Mr. Gallacher: A middle way.
Mr. Fletcher: How are we to achieve that? First of all, there is one clear way. We must establish our sheet anchor in the Far East absolutely firmly, and that is in Hong Kong; that is, we must see to the safety of Hong Kong and it must be absolutely certain and sure, and clear to the eyes of everybody in the Far East that Hong Kong will stay in its present form as a British Colony. Reinforce- ment, both military and in other forms, is absolutely essential. If there is any proof of the need of it, I have only to point to the fact that over two million Chinese have come from the mainland to Hong Kong. They, at least, appreciate what British rule in Hong Kong means.
Mr. Platts-Mills: Are they not due for reinforcement?
Mr. Fletcher: Let us recreate what by a generous gesture we destroyed at the time it appeared to be the right gesture- when we gave up extraterritorial rights in the old treaty ports. We gave up all extraterritorial rights in China, which looked to be the right thing, as so very often happens.
It was a great and generous gesture during the war by America and ourselves and the other Treaty Powers. What was the result? We deprived the Chinese of one of the most precious things they had-areas to which they could go where they were certain of getting law properly adminis- tered, order, and the possibility of some- thing like commercial dealing under stable conditions. Extraterritorial rights which we have given up have a curious sound about them. There are not many territorial rights left today that we gave up. The advance of the Communist-led forces has swept away a great deal of the territory and not only the rights, and a great deal of the territorial rights which we gave up voluntarily have now passed to the Communists. These have been conquered by the Soviet-controlled Com- munist movement there.
However, there are still areas available, such as Shanghai and Tien-tsin. Let us,
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Foreign Affairs by agreement with whatever the new government in South and Central China -or even possibly North China will be when they solidify a little-with their consent under some international body, create new treaty ports, new areas in China, which will be- of the utmost bene- fit to the Chinese themselves and which will be able to start up again on a stable economy that does not exist anywhere else in China at the present time.
There I am putting to His Majesty's Government a practical remedy instead of their feeble bleat of non-intervention under cover of which we get no action of any sort. It is not too late to do these things. They will be done with the con- sent of practically every nation in the world and the Chinese themselves. Do not let us have legalistic arguments that it will be difficult to find exactly the right formula. Let us for once take action and establish these bridgeheads against Com- munism, for that is what they will be, which are so parallel to those that my right hon. Friend the Member for War- wick and Leamington (Mr. Eden) wished to establish in Palestine. He wanted to establish there the two ends of the bridge so that it could be built between them. I am asking for bridgeheads to be estab- lished in China where we can offer a refuge to all those who will soon see that the Communist way of life which is being imposed upon them is disastrous and who wish to return to the fold.
Mr. Skeffington-Lodge: The hon. Mem- ber has just condemned non-intervention. Having done so, will he answer this ques- tion? Would he, if necessary,
go to war in China?
Mr. Fletcher: I am not suggesting that we should go to war in China, I am saying that we should establish and defend cer- refuge and strong centres there. Yes, go tain treaty ports which will be ports of
to war to that extent, but it would be a war of defence and not a war of attack.
Mr. Skeffington-Lodge: War might be involved then?
Mr. Fletcher: The hon. Member for Bedford (Mr. Skeffington-Lodge) can put it any way he likes-the facts of the case will establish themselves. The very fact that they might be attacked might show how much they were feared, how great was their use against the Communist regime in North China. The danger in