A
General Marshall's attitude would be against our taking any action which was likely to boost the present Chinese Government in any way. This suggestion will no doubt be dealt with in Mr. Bevin's reply. But whatever is said on this point, if Mr. Bevin feels that he must have some further clarification of United States attitude towards China before the Hong Kong problem is dealt with by the Cabinet, I don't think that we could reasonably resist a request to delay putting the matter to the Cabinet. The second proposition, 2(b) above, that the problem should not be considered by the Cabinet while China is grappling with an economic crisis iṣ, in my view, not one that we should accept. There would be no need, on this account, to defer consideration of the Hong Kong problem by the Cabinet. If the_Cabinet decided that a reassuring statement should be made, then the economic distress in China might be regarded as a factor affecting the timing of the statement, although I must say I see no particular reason why it should.
is
If, therefore, Mr. Bevin sends a reply to the Secretary of State on the lines indicated by Mr. Kitson, I would recommend that we should agree that the problem should be submitted straight to the Cabinet, and that if Mr. Bevin feels that he requires to have some further clarification of United States policy towards China before formulating his final views on the matter, we should of course accept the position but express the hope that this will not involve a delay of more than six weeks or two months at the outside. We should then go on to say
that