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occupy and on the ground between that and the summit to which the road to Wong-nei-Cheong mounts.
Communications.-There is a telephone from the police station at Stanley, passing by Tytam Tuk to Shankiwan, and thence to the Central Police Station in Victoria, also a telephone from Tytam Reservoir to the Central Police Station; at a recent mobilization of this section a company of the Hong Kong Regiment, from the reserve at Kowloon was at Wong-nei- Cheong Gap within one hour after embarking at Kowloon.
No. V SECTION.-Lyemun. Head-quarters Lyemun Barracks. R.A. as in 1891 Scheme (see Table attached); C and D companies Hong Kong Regiment.
Movable Armament.—Two 8-inch howitzers within the Lyemun defences. Three Gardners parapet-mountings on Sywan Ifill.
Sywan Hill is a very commanding position and commands the Shankiwan Gap and the road thereto, and would have to be carried before an attack could be made on the land sides of the battery.
For the greater part of the year the water breaks on the cast shore of the island, and it is not likely that an enemy landing in Tytam Bay would take the circuitous route by Tytam Tuk and Shankiwan.
This section can be easily reinforced from either Victoria or Kowloon, Communications.-Flag signalling from Sywan Hill to Lyemun. Military telegraphing from Lyemun Barracks to Victoria. Telephone from Shankiwan Polico Station to Central Police Station, Victoria.
No. VI SECTION.--Kowloon Peninsula, including, Kowloon land front, the East Dock, and West Batteries. Head-quarters, Orderly Room, Hong Kong Regiment. Garrisons of the batteries as in 1891 Scheme (see Table attached). A and B companies Hong Kong Regiment for land front.
Movable Armament. Two 7-pr. R.M.L. guns.
Two Maxims.
A tangled network of rotten granite hills (200 to 410 feet) scarped by quarries and scored by crevasses and gullies, occupies all but the southern point of the Kowloon Peninsula and affords no position with a clear field of fire to the front.
As the guns of the permanent batteries are intended to fight ships at the past and west entrances to the harbour, and as their fire to that end is well controlled by a chain of artillery command, the officer commanding this section will not interferc unduly with the direction of their fire, but will more particularly direct his attention to the defence of the land front and to preventing an enemy gaining a hill top whence he might annoy the batteries by rifle fire.
The method of meeting an attack from China depends on whether it is made alone or in combination with others :-
(i.) If an attack be made from China without any seaward complica- tions, and the bulk of the garrison be therefore available, a forward position will be occupied by one and a-half battalions with the right resting on hill No. 10 (see map with 1894 Scheme), and the centre and left on the broken range overlooking the Chinese boundary: 7-pr. guns at the salients and Maxims at the gaps.
Second position.-Two 7-pr. guns, or two 9-pr. R.M.L. guns from reserve at Victoria, on Mount Cockrane.
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Two -7-pr. guns, or two 9-pr. R.M.L. guns from reserve at Victoria, Kowloon Observatory.
Two 7-pr. guns, No. 12 hill, overlooking Kowloon East Battery, with outposts at Nos. 10 and 13 hills.
The second position has the clearest field of fire in the Peninsula. No. 12 hill, where a small block-house and a shelter-trench following the contour of the hill are to be constructed, has considerable command over the Peninsula, and a fair field of fire over the hills to the north.
Mount Cockrane is itself a scarped promontory of rotting granite, and with an epaulment on top and shelter-trench for infantry becomes a redoubt difficult of access, commanding the streets of Yaumati and the country to Gun Club Hill on the east.
Hill No. 13 in its front commands the valley running north-east from
Yaumati.
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(ii.) If an attack on Hong Kong Island were made at the same time as an advance from Chinese soil, the defence would be in the second position described above, for it would be utterly in vain to push a small force of three or four companies into the network of hills where it could be easily turned.
In either of these cases the guns from Kowloon West and East, although not bearing on the ground between the hills, command the coast line on the west and the level ground on the east between the foot of the hills and the sea; both cross fire on the ground from Kowloon Point to the hills bounding the rifle range on the north, the ground commanded from the second position.
The guns at Stonecutters, although somewhat distant, command the whole coast from the boundary line southward, and would be effective against formed bodies of troops and would prevent the construction of batteries on the west and north-west slopes of the hills.
9. I am of opinion that the 9-2-inch gun in Kowloon east should be defiladed from hill No. 10, for if that hill were abandoned by us, and it is a very forward position for the second of the cases mentioned above, rifle fire from there would be very galling to the gun detachment. This has been opposed on the ground that it would deprive the gun of the power of firing on these hills, a deprivation, to my mind, utterly unimportant, for no large body of men would get on to the top of the hills, for they lead to nowhere, and to fire a 9-2-inch gun at skirmishers would be like cracking walnuts with a steam-hammer. The cost of defilading is 371. I have written to the Inspector-General of Fortifications on this subject.
10. The 25-inch R.M.L. guns of the battery that I ask for in my letter annexed (marked B) would be very useful in the East battery for action against troops.
11. Reserves. At Victoria, A, B, and C Companies Rifle Brigade,
4 officers and 46 N.C.O.s and men Royal Artillery, 3 officers and
88 N.C.O.s and men (including S. M. Miners) Royal Engineers.
Seven 9-pr. R.M.L. guns.
Four 7-pr. R.M L. guns.
Four Maxims belonging to Colonial Government.
At Kowloon, G and II Companies, Hong Kong Regiment.
North Point Battery is in the inner line of the defences, it acts on the general orders given to it, and is in telegraphic communication with head- quarters.
12. As it is unlikely that the Colony will be attacked simultaneously from the Chinese continent, by ships at the cast and west entrances and by landing parties on the island, the garrisons of places not attacked may be regarded as available supports.
13. Signalling, Telephoning, &c.—~As regards taking ninety-one men from the ranks as signallers, so many flag stations are required here that chances of error or delay are multiplied, and on many days the fog simply prevents the use of flag signalling.
I consider it far wiser to make use of the excellent telephone system of the Colony, which enables one to transmit intelligence from Slankiwan, Cape D'Aguilars, Stanley, Tytam Tuk Reservoir, Deep Water Bay (telegraph), Aberdeen, and Pokfulum to the Head-quarters of the Police, and I have secured the permission of His Excellency the Governor to connect this at once with Head-quarters before the moment of need, and I have recently applied by letter for 301. to meet the expense. Flag-signalling will therefore generally be confined to short distances within sections.
The existing telephone system will be extended on going into a state of preparation to points in each section as far as the plant now available will allow. I have applied for plant to enable a more complete system to be
carried out.
14. I consider that twenty scouts, quick of foot and long of breath, are necessary in this hilly country to scout, and to connect our patrols and the police look-outs with the officers commanding sections, and the first thing I shall do if called upon to defend the Colony will be to engage some of the sturdy hill coolies for this purpose.
15. I have already noted the small number of volunteers, and had,
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