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CO 537/1261
THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the National Archives' terms and conditions and that your
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3.
LONG TERM PROBLEM
The South East Asia Defence Committee at a meeting on 30th August, 1946, considorod the views of the Governor of Hong Kong on the extent of the garrison of that colony. Their conclusions wore that sinco considerable quantities of modern arms hnd boen supplied to China by both the United Kingdom and the U.S.A. and much equipment had been loft bohind in the country by the Japanese, the assumption made by the C.-in-0., Hong Kong, in his appreciation, that an attacking army would be adequately equipped still held good. They therefore considered that, to act as a deterrent, a garrison of one British brindo and one field artillery rogiment would be required permanently in the Colony, with another brigade group available within S.E.A.0. and capable of being rapidly transported to liong Kong in emergency.
4.
It had previously been suggested by the War Office, that it would be undesirable to tie up permanently regular British troops in Hong Kong and that a gendarmeric capable of ensuring the internal security of the Colony rnd deterring guerilla incursions should be raised to take their place. While it is probable that ultimately a force of this nature will be adequate, we agree with SACSDA that under present conditions it would be insufficient.
5.
Furthermore it has been represented by SACSEA that Indian troops, assuming India were willing to supply them, would be uncatisfactory as the solo garrison of the Colony. We agree with this view.
6.
In view therefore of the above, and of the prustige veluc of British forces in this important commercial port, we consider that it should be accepted in principle that the garrison of the Colony, the strength of which has already been approved as of the ordor of one brigade, should consist of a British formation as recommended by the Governor of Hong Kong end the S. E. Asia Defence Committec. Thin British force would be required until the gendarmerie was capable of ensuring the security of the colony having regard to conditions existing in Chinn at the time. Thereafter, the garrison duties would be undertaken solely by the gendarmerie. At all times it would be desirable to have a brigade group in reserve available at call within S.E.A.C.
7.
In view of the pressing need for economy in the use of British forces, it would be advisable for the War Office and Colonial Office to continue discussion of the formation of a rondarmerie. However, owing to the difficulty of forecastin- when it will be possible to disponse with the British garrison we feel it may not be possible for the Colonial Office to proceed beyond the oxtont of preparing plans which might includo, amongst other items, preparation of establishments and training syllabii nd consideration of conditions of service.
+ SEACOS 747
≈ 0.0.8. (46) 193(0).
→ SEACOS 714, 19th June, 1946.
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